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STATE OF UTAH, DIVISION OF 
WILDLIFE RESOURCES, 
Appellee. 
Case No. 20010839-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE DIVISION OF WILDLIFE RESOURCES 
JURISDICTION 
This petition for review is taken from a final agency action of the Utah 
Wildlife Board administratively suspending Appellant's big game hunting 
privileges for a period of five years pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-9 (1998) 
and Utah Admin. Code R657-26 (1999). The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(1) (1997) and 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a). (Supp. 2001). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the Utah Wildlife Board correctly interpreted the statutory 
definition of "resident" found in Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-2(37)(a) (1998). 
-1-
Standard of review: Typically, the standard of review under Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1997) for an agency's interpretation of statute is a 
correction-of-error standard. Uintah Oil Assoc, v. County Board of Equalization of 
Uintah County. 853 P.2d 894, 896 (Utah 1993). Nevertheless, the Legislature 
often grants agencies explicit or implicit discretion in dealing with statutory terms. 
Morton Int'l. Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission. 814 P.2d 
581, 587-88 (Utah 1991). In such instances, an agency's interpretation of a 
statute is granted deference by the reviewing court. kL Agency discretion in 
interpreting statute may be implied where the statutory language suggests the 
Legislature left the question at issue unresolved, or where "there is more than 
one permissible reading of the statute and no basis in the statutory language or 
legislative history to prefer one interpretation over another." jcL What constitutes 
a "resident" as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-2(37)(a) is subject to varying 
interpretations, and the Utah Wildlife Board is statutorily granted broad policy 
making authority in Utah Code Ann. §§ 23-14-3 (1998) and 23-14-18 (1998). 
Accordingly, the Utah Wildlife Board's interpretation of "resident" should be 
granted deference by this Court. 
2. Whether the Utah Wildlife Board correctly admitted and considered 
evidence at the hearing in harmony with the administrative Notice of Agency 
Action and the Division of Wildlife Resources' hearing officer's decision. 
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Standard of review: Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(e) (1997), an 
agency's compliance with prescribed procedures is a question of law and 
reviewed for correctness with no deference afforded the agency. Whitear v. 
Labor Commission, 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Krantz v. Utah Dep't 
of Commerce, 856 P.2d 369, 370 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
3. Whether the Utah Wildlife Board's factual findings of flagrant and 
knowing conduct are supported by sufficient evidence in the record. 
Standard of review: Under Title 63, Chapter 46b of the Utah Code, 
administrative findings of fact should be affirmed where they are "supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court." 
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah 1989). Substantial 
evidence is something less than the weight of the evidence but more than a mere 
scintilla. |a\ "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable 
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." j d 
4. Whether the Utah Wildlife Board properly considered Appellant's 
facially valid guilty plea to and criminal conviction of Wanton Destruction of 
Protected Wildlife. 
Standard of review: The standard of review under Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-16(4) (1997) for an agency's application or interpretation of the law is a 
correction-of-error standard. Uintah Oil Assoc. 853 P.2d at 896; Morton. 814 
P.2d at 588. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. RULES. AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS1 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-2(12)(a) (1998). 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-2(24) (1998). 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-2(37)(a) (1998). 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-5 (1998). 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-9 (1998). 
6. Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-4 (1998). 
7. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(2) (1997). 
8. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8 (1997). 
9. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(2) (1995). 
10. Utah Administrative Code R657-26-2(2)(b) (1999). 
11. Utah Administrative Code R657-26-8 (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 29, 2000, the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources ("Division") 
mailed Notice of Agency Action to Appellant commencing an administrative 
license suspension proceeding pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-9 (1998) and 
Utah Admin. Code R657-26 (1999). (R. 55 and Addendum C). An informal 
administrative hearing was held pursuant to the Notice of Agency Action on 
November 29, 2000 wherein the Division hearing officer heard evidence from 
1
 The statutes and rules listed in this section are included in the 
Addendum. 
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Appellant and the Division. (R. 18). After hearing the evidence and legal 
argument, the hearing officer concluded Appellant "flagrantly and knowingly" 
killed a bull elk with an invalid license, and the hearing officer suspended his big 
game hunting privileges for a period of five years. (R. 18). 
On January 25, 2001, Appellant appealed the hearing officer's decision to 
the Utah Wildlife Board ("Wildlife Board") pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-
9(12) and Utah Admin. Code R657-26-8. (R. 11). The Wildlife Board 
subsequently held a de novo, formal administrative hearing on May 17, 2001 
pursuant to Utah Admin. Code R657-26-8(5) to consider the matter of Appellant's 
hunting license suspension. (R. 1). Both Appellant and the Division offered 
evidence and argument at the hearing. (R. 1). On September 26, 2001, the 
Wildlife Board issued its written Order affirming the five year suspension of 
Appellant's big game hunting privileges. (R. 1 and Addendum C). 
Appellant appealed the Wildlife Board's Order to the Utah Court of Appeals 
on October 24, 2001 pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(1). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Officer Jack Topham is a certified peace officer employed by the Division 
as a criminal investigator. (R. 118 at 20-21). In the Fall of 1998, Officer Topham 
received information from a confidential informant that Appellant was domiciled in 
Utah and killed a six point bull elk in 1997 using an illegally purchased Utah 
nonresident limited entry bull elk license. (R. 118 at 21). Officer Topham's 
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investigation of this matter and evidence offered in subsequent hearings reveals 
the following. 
Appellant admits he has lived in Utah since 1976. (R. 118 at 68). At all 
relevant times, he has been domiciled in Utah, employed in Utah, registered to 
vote in Utah, and taxed in Utah. (R. 118 at 25, 69-70). However, in 1993 
Appellant unlawfully obtained an Idaho drivers license using his sister's Idaho 
daycare center's address to facilitate an illegal scheme of obtaining resident 
Idaho hunting licenses. (R. 118 at 22, 70). In 1997, Appellant applied for and 
obtained a Utah nonresident limited entry bull elk license. (R118 at 23-24, 67-
69). He falsely listed his sister's Idaho daycare center's address as his, a phone 
number with an Idaho area code as his, and an Idaho drivers license number in 
his application for the 1997 Utah nonresident limited entry bull elk license. (R118 
at 23-24, 67-69). He ultimately received a Utah nonresident limited entry bull elk 
license on the Book Cliffs/Bitter Creek unit, and in 1997 he was successful in 
killing a mature six point bull elk. (R. 118 at 26, 69). That same year, Appellant 
fraudulently obtained a resident Idaho hunting license and was ultimately 
convicted in Idaho for that offense, among others, on or about September 23, 
1999. (R. 98 and R. 118 at 33, 84-85). 
The Uintah County Attorney's Officer filed criminal charges against 
Appellant for killing in 1997 the six point bull elk. (R. 118 at 27-28). Appellant 
was specifically charged with violating Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-4 (1998) by killing 
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the bull elk with an illegal and invalid nonresident license obtained in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-5 (1998). (R. 118 at 28-30, 51). Under Section 23-19-5, 
it is unlawful for any person to obtain a license by fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation, and it is unlawful for a resident to purchase a nonresident 
license. 
Appellant pleaded guilty to the charge of Wanton Destruction of Protected 
Wildlife (Section 23-20-4), a Class A Misdemeanor, on December 15,1999 in the 
Eighth Judicial District Court for Uintah County, State of Utah. (R. 96). The 
factual basis underlying the conviction was Appellant's killing a six point bull elk 
on the Book Cliffs limited entry unit with an unlawfully obtained Utah nonresident 
license. The nonresident license was deemed invalid and the kill consequently 
illegal since Appellant obtained the license by misrepresenting his actual status 
as a resident. (R.118 at 52-53). The factual basis supporting the charge was 
provided to the court and the plea entered thereto. The court accepted the plea 
and concluded it was knowingly made and had a factual basis. (R. 96). 
Based on these facts, the Wildlife Board suspended Appellant's big game 
hunting privileges for five years, concluding he "flagrantly and knowingly" 
obtained a Utah nonresident bull elk license in violation of the law and unlawfully 
used it as ostensible authority to kill a bull elk. (R. 1). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Wildlife Board's legal conclusion that Appellant was a resident of Utah 
in 1997 when he purchased a Utah nonresident bull elk license should be 
affirmed on the following two grounds. First, Appellant pleaded guilty to the 
criminal charge of killing a bull elk with an illegally obtained and invalid license. 
The license was invalid since he obtained a Utah nonresident license while a 
Utah resident in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-5. By pleading guilty, 
Appellant effectively admitted all the essential elements of the crime charged and 
cannot now attempt to change that admission. Appellant waived whatever rights 
he had to challenge his residency or nonresidency status when he pleaded guilty 
to unlawfully killing the bull elk. Second, Appellant was legally a resident of Utah 
in 1997 when he fraudulently purchased a nonresident bull elk license. For 
purposes of obtaining a hunting or fishing license in Utah, a "resident" is a person 
who: 1) has been domiciled in the state for six months immediately preceding the 
purchase of a license; and 2) does not claim residency in any other state for 
purposes of hunting and fishing. See Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-2(37)(a). The 
Legislature has not defined the word "claim," but states elsewhere in Title 23 of 
the Utah Code ("Wildlife Code") that fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation may not 
be used to obtain a license. The code further states a resident may not purchase 
a nonresident license. See Section 23-19-5. Construing "claim" in context with 
these Wildlife Code provisions demonstrates the Legislature's intent to exclude 
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false or fraudulent claims of residency in another state from forming the basis of 
nonresidency. In other words, a person domiciled in Utah cannot legally 
purchase a nonresident license solely on a false claim of residency in another 
state. To hold otherwise would allow Utah residents to transform into 
nonresidents with nothing more than a spurious claim of residency in another 
state. The Wildlife Board properly concluded that the "claim of residency in 
another state," as used in the definition of "resident," must be a bona fide claim. 
In its de novo review of Appellant's five year hunting license suspension, 
the Wildlife Board properly considered evidence pertaining to his domicile in 
Utah, his unlawful acquisition of an Idaho drivers license for purposes of 
fraudulently obtaining resident Idaho hunting licenses, his unlawful purchase of 
resident Idaho hunting licenses, his Idaho conviction for purchasing resident 
Idaho hunting licenses, and the false information used to unlawfully obtain a Utah 
nonresident bull elk license. The evidence is all within the scope of the 
administrative Notice of Agency Action and the Division's suspension order under 
review. The evidence is further probative of the issue of whether Appellant's 
conduct in unlawfully obtaining a Utah nonresident elk license and killing an elk 
with it was committed "flagrantly and knowingly," a necessary element under Utah 
Code Ann. § 23-19-9(1 )(a) for suspending a hunting license. Appellant's 
challenge to the Wildlife Board's authority to conduct a de novo review of the 
Division's suspension order was never raised below and cannot now be raised on 
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appeal. Nevertheless, the de novo review was within the Wildlife Board's 
authority, necessary, and proper. 
The Wildlife Board properly found that Appellant's conduct in unlawfully 
obtaining a Utah nonresident bull elk license was committed "flagrantly and 
knowingly." Appellant deceived the Division and obtained the nonresident license 
by intentionally providing a false Idaho address and phone number, listing an 
illegal Idaho drivers license number, and fraudulently claiming nonresident status. 
Appellant literally stole the opportunity to receive the permit and take a trophy bull 
elk from a legitimate nonresident. The fraud was committed knowingly and is 
conspicuously bad or offensive to ethical sportsmen that wait years to receive 
such licenses. Appellant's assertion that the definition of "knowingly" found in 
Utah Admin. Code R657-26-2(2)(b) is inconsistent with the criminal culpability 
definition of "knowingly" in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(2) (1995) was not raised 
at the hearing before the Wildlife Board and is, therefore, waived. Nevertheless, 
the Wildlife Board and the Division have the statutory authority and need to define 
"knowingly" as used in Section 23-19-9(1 )(a) since the term is not defined in the 
Wildlife Code or linked to any other definition in the code. The fact the definition 
differs slightly from that in the criminal code does not compromise its validity. 
A criminal conviction on a violation of the Wildlife Code is necessary before 
an administrative suspension order may be entered against a violator's hunting 
privileges. Guilty pleas are criminal convictions and presumed valid unless set 
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aside or overturned by a court of competent jurisdiction. Appellant's guilty plea in 
the Eighth Judicial District Court for Uintah County, State of Utah, to Wanton 
Destruction of Protected Wildlife has never been challenged on direct appeal or 
collaterally. Any defect in the criminal information upon which Appellant entered 
his guilty plea was waived when the plea was entered. Moreover, the Wildlife 
Board did not err in considering the conviction since it lacks authority to disregard 
or invalidate a facially valid conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE WILDLIFE BOARD'S CONCLUSION THAT APPELLANT WAS A 
UTAH RESIDENT AND THAT HE UNLAWFULLY OBTAINED A UTAH 
NONRESIDENT BULL ELK LICENSE SHOULD BE SUSTAINED. 
Appellant asserts the Wildlife Board erred in its interpretation of the 
definition of "resident" found in Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-2(37)(a) (1998) when it 
concluded he unlawfully obtained a Utah nonresident limited entry bull elk license 
in 1997. Specifically, Appellant challenges the Wildlife Board's conclusion that a 
fraudulent or spurious claim of residency in another state is insufficient under the 
statutory definition of "resident" to render a person domiciled in the State of Utah 
a nonresident for purposes of hunting. 
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A. Appellant Waived the Right to Challenge His Status as a Utah 
Resident When He Pleaded Guilty to Wanton Destruction of 
Protected Wildlife. 
Appellant entered a plea of guilty to the charge of Wanton Destruction of 
Protected Wildlife on December 15, 1999 in the Eighth Judicial District Court for 
Uintah County, State of Utah. (R. 96). The factual basis underlying the conviction 
was Appellant's killing a six point bull elk on the Book Cliffs/Bitter Creek limited 
entry unit with an unlawfully obtained Utah nonresident license. The nonresident 
license was deemed void and the kill consequently illegal since Appellant 
obtained the license by misrepresenting his actual status as a resident. (R.118 at 
52-53). 
Appellant pleaded guilty to a criminal charge which had as an element the 
killing of a bull elk with an invalid nonresident license. He had the opportunity in 
the criminal proceeding to raise the legal defense of being a Utah nonresident by 
virtue of his claim of residency in Idaho, but he instead elected to plead guilty to 
the offense. "The general rule applicable in criminal proceedings, and the cases 
are legion, is that by pleading guilty, the defendant is deemed to have admitted all 
the essential elements of the crime charged and thereby waives all 
nonjurisdictional defects " State v. Parsons. 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 
1989). Appellant's status as a "resident" or "nonresident" as defined in Utah 
Code Ann. § 23-13-2(24) and (37) is an issue of statutory construction and 
cannot be construed as a jurisdictional defect in any circumstance. Appellant 
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pleaded guilty and thereafter cannot attempt in an administrative license 
suspension proceeding to collaterally attack his plea and the elements of the 
offense he admitted. The plea and conviction has never been appealed or 
challenged in a court of competent jurisdiction, and Appellant cannot now attempt 
to interpret the definition of "resident" different from that which he pleaded guilty 
to. (R. 118 at 87-88). 
B. Alternatively. Appellant's Fraudulent Claim of Residency in 
Idaho for Purposes of Hunting While Domiciled in Utah is 
Legally Insufficient Under Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-2(37)(a) 
(1998) to Qualify Him as a Nonresident Hunter in Utah. 
Appellant frankly admits that all relevant times, he has been domiciled in 
Utah, employed in Utah, registered to vote in Utah, and taxed in Utah. (R. 118 at 
25, 68-70). In 1997, however, Appellant applied for and obtained a Utah 
nonresident limited entry bull elk license. (R. 118 at 23-24, 67-69). Appellant 
listed his sister's Idaho daycare center's address as his, a phone number with an 
Idaho area code as his, and an Idaho drivers license number in his application for 
the 1997 Utah nonresident limited entry bull elk license. (R. 118 at 23-24, 67-69). 
He ultimately received a Utah nonresident limited entry bull elk license on the 
Book Cliffs/Bitter Creek unit, and in 1997 he was successful in killing a mature six 
point bull elk. (R. 118 at 26, 69). Appellant's claim of residency in Idaho for 
purposes of hunting was fraudulent. (R. 98 and R. 118 at 33, 84-85). 
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On the basis of his fraudulent claim of Idaho residency in 1997, Appellant 
asserts he was a nonresident hunter in Utah under the definition of "resident" 
found in Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-2(37)(a). Appellant asks this Court to validate 
his Utah nonresident limited entry application solely on the basis of the fraud he 
perpetrated in Idaho. 
"'Resident' means a person who: (i) has been domiciled in the state of 
Utah for six consecutive months immediately preceding the purchase of a license; 
and (ii) does not claim residency for hunting, fishing, or trapping in any other state 
or country." ]<± "'Nonresident' means a person who does not qualify as a 
resident." See Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-2(24). Appellant maintains the word 
"claim," as used in Section 23-13-2(37)(a)(ii), includes not only bona fide claims 
of residency in other states but also spurious claims. Such an interpretation, 
however, is inconsistent with other sections of Title 23 of the Utah Code and 
contrary to the rules of statutory construction. 
The primary objective in construing statutory enactments is to give effect to 
the Legislature's intent. Lyon v. Burton. 5 P.3d 616, 622 (Utah 2000). "The plain 
language of a statute is generally the best indication of that intent." id. 
Nevertheless, "[t]he plain language of a statute is to be read as a whole, and its 
provisions interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and 
'with other statutes under the same and related chapters.'" Id. (quoting Roberts 
v. Erickson, 851 P.2d 643, 644 (Utah 1993)). 
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In interpreting the critical words, we follow basic principles of 
statutory construction. First, terms of related code provisions should 
be construed in a harmonious fashion. Grayson Roper Ltd. 
Partnership v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467, 471-72 (Utah 1989). 
Second, statutory terms should be interpreted and applied according 
to their commonly accepted meaning unless the ordinary meaning of 
the term results in an application that is either "unreasonably 
confused, inoperable, [] or in blatant contradiction of the express 
purpose of the statute." Morton Int'L Inc. v. Auditing Div. Of the Utah 
State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581, 590 (Utah 1991)... . Third, '"[i]f 
there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or application of the 
provisions of an act, it is appropriate to analyze the act in its entirely, 
in light of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance 
with its intent and purpose.'" Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d 
1037, 1045 (Utah 1991) (quoting Osuala v. Aetna Life and Casualty. 
608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980). 
State v. Souza. 846 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
The word "claim," as used in Section 23-13-2(37)(a)(ii), is undefined and 
subject to varying interpretation as evidenced by this very issue being appealed. 
Appellant disregards related code provisions and attempts to construe the word 
"claim" in isolation. However, the meaning of a statutory term should not be 
determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used. 
Brixen & Christopher Architects v. State. 29 P.3d 650, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). 
Courts should interpret statutory terms as a comprehensive whole and not in a 
piecemeal fashion. JdL In construing the word "claim," it must be read and 
interpreted in harmony with Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-5 (1998), which states: 
It is unlawful for any person to obtain or attempt to obtain a license, 
permit, tag or certificate of registration by fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation. It is unlawful for a nonresident to purchase a 
resident license. It is unlawful for a resident to purchase a 
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nonresident license. Any person violating provisions of this section 
is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
Appellant's asserted definition of "claim" to include fraudulent and spurious 
claims blatantly contradicts and renders inoperable the terms of Section 23-19-5 
in two respects. 
First, the Utah Legislature has specifically expressed its intent regarding 
the issue of residents purchasing nonresident hunting licenses. "It is unlawful for 
a resident to purchase a nonresident license." \± It is recognized that the term 
"resident," as used in this section, is defined in Section 23-13-2(37)(a) to exclude 
persons domiciled in Utah that "claim" residency in another state. Nevertheless, 
interpreting "claim" of residency to include patently false claims completely guts 
the purpose and intent of Section 23-19-5. If "claim" is interpreted as Appellant 
suggests it should, any person domiciled in Utah could transform from resident 
into nonresident by simply making a spurious claim of residency in another state 
or country. Such an interpretation would render the prohibition against residents 
purchasing nonresident licenses found in Section 23-19-5 absolutely meaningless 
and unenforceable. Although Appellant acted upon his false claim of residency in 
Idaho by fraudulently purchasing a resident Idaho hunting license, his proposed 
interpretation of "claim" would not require such action. A mere false claim to 
oneself would suffice. The claim of residency described in Section 23-13-2(37)(a) 
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must be interpreted and confined to bona fide claims in order to give meaning 
and effect to Section 23-19-5. 
Second, Section 23-19-5 expressly prohibits any person from obtaining a 
license or permit by fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. Interpreting "claim" to 
include false claims allows a person domiciled in Utah to obtain a nonresident 
license by deceitfully claiming residency in another state. But for the deceit, that 
person would be ineligible to obtain a Utah nonresident license. Therefore, 
Appellant's interpretation of "claim" is in direct conflict with Section 23-19-5 and 
inconsistent with the rules of statutory construction. 
Construing the definition of "resident" in Section 23-13-2(37)(a) in harmony 
with other provisions of Title 23 of the Utah Code and in accord with the rules of 
statutory construction requires the interpretation that any claim of residency in 
another state or country by a person domiciled in Utah must be actual and bona 
fide before a Utah nonresident license may legally be purchased. 
II. THE WILDLIFE BOARD DID NOT ERR IN THE MANNER IT 
CONDUCTED THE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING ON APPEAL OR IN 
THE SCOPE OF EVIDENCE CONSIDERED. 
Appellant charges the Wildlife Board with a number of procedural 
deficiencies in the manner it conducted his administrative hearing on appeal and 
in the evidence considered. Specifically, he alleges the Wildlife Board did not 
have authority to conduct a de novo review of the Division of Wildlife Resources 
administrative order and it considered evidence beyond the scope of the Notice of 
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Agency Action. A brief overview of the Division's license suspension process 
may be helpful in understanding the issues. 
The Division's administrative license suspension proceedings are initiated 
with a Notice of Agency Action prepared and served on the licensee as required 
in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(2) (1997) and Utah Admin. Code R657-26-3 
(1999).2 The licensee may request and receive an informal hearing before the 
Division's administrative hearing officer. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5 (1997); 
Utah Admin. Code R657-26-4 and 5 (1999). Upon conclusion of the informal 
hearing, the hearing officer issues an administrative order stating the decision 
with a notice of the right to appeal to the Wildlife Board. See Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-5 (1997); Utah Admin. Code R657-26-6 (1999). The Wildlife Board 
considers all license suspension appeals from orders of the Division's 
administrative hearing officer by conducting a de novo, formal adjudicative 
hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8 (1997) and Utah Admin. Code 
R657-26-8 (1999). The Wildlife Board's decision and order may be appealed to 
the Utah Court of Appeals for a review of the record. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-16(1997). 
2
 Utah Admin. Code R657-26 was amended effective October 17, 2001. 
The rule effective during Appellant's administrative license suspension 
proceedings before the Division and the Wildlife Board is attached as Addendum 
B. All future references to this rule chapter, unless otherwise stated, will refer to 
that attached as Addendum B. 
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A. The Wildlife Board's De Novo Review of the Division's Initial 
Administrative Order Should be Upheld. 
1. To the Extent Appellant Challenges the Wildlife Board's 
Authority to Conduct a De Novo Review of the Division's 
Administrative Suspension Order, He Failed to Object to this 
Issue Below and has Waived the Right to Appeal it. 
"The general rule is that objections or questions not raised or urged in an 
agency proceeding are considered waived and will not be considered by a court 
on review." Esguivel v. Labor Commission of Utah, 7 P.3d 777, 783 (Utah 2000); 
Brown & Root Indus. Service v. Industrial Commission. 947 P.2d 671, 677 (Utah 
1997); Alvin G. Rhodes Pump Sales v. Industrial Commission. 681 P.2d 1244, 
1249 (Utah 1984). 
At the beginning of the Wildlife Board's May 17, 2001 formal hearing on 
Appellant's license suspension appeal, the Board Chairman specifically stated 
that the hearing would be formal and conducted pursuant to the Administrative 
Procedures Act. (R. 118 at 4). He further stated that both parties would be 
afforded the opportunity to present evidence, call witnesses, call rebuttal 
witnesses, and cross-examine adverse witnesses. (R. 118 at 5-6). Moreover, 
counsel for the Division argued at the hearing on Appellant's objection to the 
introduction of certain evidence and in closing argument that the Wildlife Board's 
hearing was a de novo review of the Division's administrative hearing officer's 
decision. (R. 118 at 78, 98). However, the record is void of any objection by 
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Appellant challenging the Wildlife Board's legal authority to conduct a de novo 
review of the Division's administrative order. Appellant's failure to raise this issue 
before the Wildlife Board at his May 17, 2001 hearing precludes him from now 
raising it on appeal. 
2. The Wildlife Board's Review of the Division's Initial 
Administrative Order was Appropriately Conducted as a 
De Novo Review. 
Appellant asserts Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-9(12)(b) (1998) and Utah 
Admin. Code R657-26-8(8) (1999) confine the Wildlife Board's administrative 
review of the Division's license suspension proceedings to a review of the record. 
However, the two sections simply direct the Wildlife Board to review the basis 
underlying the Division's decision to suspend hunting privileges. Nothing in these 
sections explicitly dictates the manner of review. 
The Division's authority to suspend hunting privileges is found in Utah 
Code Ann. §23-19-9 (1998).3 The Wildlife Board is specifically charged with 
responsibility in Section 23-19-9(12)(b) to "review the [division] hearing officer's 
findings and conclusions and any documentation submitted at the hearing." The 
Wildlife Board is further granted authority in Section 23-19-9(13) to "make rules to 
implement this section in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative 
3
 Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-9 was amended by the Legislature effective 
April 30, 2001. The section effective during Appellant's administrative hearings 
and appeals is attached as Addendum A. All future references to this code 
section, unless otherwise stated, will refer to that attached as Addendum A. 
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Procedures Act." Pursuant to its rule making authority, the Wildlife Board 
promulgated a rule designating its review proceedings as formal adjudicative 
hearings to be conducted in accordance with the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act. See Utah Admin. Code R657-26-8(5). Although the rule does not 
specifically identify the review proceeding as de novo,4 the nature of a formal 
hearing envisions, if not necessitates it. 
Formal adjudicative proceedings grant the parties the right to present 
evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit rebuttal 
evidence. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8(1). The presiding officer is further 
charged to "regulate the course of the hearing to obtain full disclosure of relevant 
facts and to afford all parties reasonable opportunity to present their positions." 
k l The presiding officer may exclude irrelevant or immaterial evidence, shall 
exclude privileged evidence, may receive documentary evidence, and may take 
official notice of evidence capable of judicial notice under the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. JcL Lastly, formal hearings must be recorded to preserve a record for 
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, id, A formal adjudicative hearing, as 
described in Section 63-46b-8, in no way resembles a review of the record. 
4
 The amended Utah Admin. Code R657-26, effective October 17, 2001, 
codifies the former practice of de novo hearings by specifically stating in R657-
26-8(5) that Wildlife Board license suspension review proceedings are formal and 
de novo. 
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Indeed, a transcript of the Division's administrative hearing is not provided to the 
Wildlife Board for review at its formal appeal hearing. 
This Court in a similar case, Cordova v. Blackstock. 861 P.2d 449 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993), concluded that judicial review of an informal administrative hearing 
required a de novo review as opposed to a review of the record. Among the 
reasons cited in support of the decision, was the need to prepare a complete 
record at the district court level since the next level of appeal went to the Court of 
Appeals. JdL at 452. Informal proceedings are less likely to result in an adequate 
record. 1<± De novo review of an informal agency proceeding ensures that an 
adequate record will be created and further provides an opportunity to correct 
deficiencies. Jd "Only then can this state's appellate courts properly review an 
informal administrative proceeding." ]cL For the reasons stated in Cordova, the 
Wildlife Board must likewise conduct its review of the Division's informal license 
suspension proceedings de novo in a formal hearing to prepare an adequate 
record for review by the appellate courts of this state.6 
B. The Wildlife Board Did Not Consider Matters Beyond the Scope of 
the Notice of Agency Action. 
The Notice of Agency Action commencing the Division's informal license 
suspension proceeding against Appellant states in part: 
5
 Judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings is made to the Utah 
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 
(1997). 
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The Division alleges that on December 15, 1999, Respondent 
pled guilty and was convicted in the Uintah County Justice Court of 
violating Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-4, a Class A Misdemeanor, 
Criminal Case Number 991800274. Respondent shot and killed a 
bull elk with a Non-resident Limited Entry Book Cliffs Elk Permit 
when he was a resident of Utah. 
The purpose of this proceeding is to determine whether the 
facts underlying the criminal conviction were committed knowingly 
and flagrantly. 
Under Rule 8(e)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "pleadings shall be 
simple, concise, and direct." Technical forms of pleading are not required. |a\ 
Moreover, "[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice." 
See Rule 8(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. "In a notice pleading 
jurisdiction like Utah, rule 8(a) 'is to be liberally construed when determining the 
sufficiency of plaintiff's complaint.'" Consolidated Reality Group v. Sizzling 
Platter. Inc.. 930 P.2d 268, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Gill v. Timm. 720 
P.2d 1352, 1353 (Utah 1986)). "The days of strict adherence to draconian 
formalities at the pleading stage are over." \jL The fundamental purpose of the 
liberalized pleading rules is to afford the opposing party fair notice of the claims 
lodged against him and the facts upon which the claims rest. |<± ; Williams v. 
State Farm Ins. Co.. 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982). Although the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure may not specifically apply to pleadings in administrative 
adjudications, applying a more stringent pleading requirement in less formal 
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administrative proceedings than in a formal judicial adjudication is 
counterintuitive. 
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized liberal pleading 
requirements in administrative proceedings. "Generally, administrative 
pleadings are to be liberally construed...." Pilcher v. State Dept. of Social 
Services. 663 P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 1983). 
Appellant assets the Wildlife Board erred by allowing the introduction of 
and considering evidence regarding his Utah conviction of Wanton Destruction 
of Protected Wildlife, Idaho convictions of unlawfully purchasing resident hunting 
licenses, acquiring an Idaho drivers license, and listing a false Idaho address 
and phone number on his 1997 Utah nonresident limited entry elk license 
application. Appellant alleges all these facts are beyond the scope of the Notice 
of Agency Action. 
The Notice of Agency Action succinctly summarizes its scope in stating; 
"[t]he purpose of this proceeding is to determine whether the facts underlying the 
criminal conviction were committed knowingly and flagrantly." Appellant's 
conviction in the Eighth Judicial District Court of Utah for violating Utah Code 
Ann. § 23-20-4 is an essential element prerequisite to suspending his hunting 
privileges. See Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-9(5). The Notice clearly identifies the 
Utah criminal conviction as a matter pertinent to the administrative action. The 
Notice further identifies the other element necessary before suspension of 
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hunting privileges is permitted. The Division must establish that the facts 
underlying the criminal conviction were committed "knowingly" and "flagrantly". 
See Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-9(1 )(a). 
Appellant maintained in the hearing before the Wildlife Board that his 
purchase of a Utah nonresident bull elk license was innocent, that he was not 
aware it was illegal. (R. 118 at 42,85). The Division carries the burden of proof 
in license suspension proceedings before the Wildlife Board and must establish 
the criminal violation was committed "knowingly" and "flagrantly." Moreover, 
Appellant's Utah conviction of illegally killing a bull elk in 1997 is premised upon 
using an unlawfully obtained and invalid nonresident license. The nonresident 
license was obtained in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-5 which prohibits 
using fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in obtaining a license and further enjoins 
residents from purchasing nonresident licenses. 
Evidence pertaining to Appellant's Idaho convictions of fraudulently 
acquiring resident hunting licenses was relevant and necessary to establish that 
his claim of residency in that state was spurious. Otherwise, his claim of Idaho 
residency would be presumed valid and his purchase of a Utah nonresident 
hunting license deemed legal. The evidence further shows a scheme of 
deception in both states which goes to the knowing and flagrant requirement. 
Evidence pertaining to Appellant's unlawful acquisition of an Idaho drivers 
license also shows he was not an Idaho resident. It further shows a scheme to 
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defraud both states in obtaining hunting licenses. Appellant frankly admits that 
he acquired the Idaho drivers license to facilitate obtaining Idaho resident 
hunting licenses. (R. 118 at 70). 
Lastly, evidence of Appellant listing a false Idaho address and phone 
number on his 1997 Utah nonresident limited entry bull elk license application 
strikes right to the heart of his defense. Listing an Idaho address, phone number 
and drivers license number on his Utah application supports the conclusion that 
Appellant was attempting to avoid raising red flags and conceal from the Division 
his true Utah residency status. These acts are inconsistent with Appellant's 
testimony that he believed obtaining a nonresident hunting license in Utah was 
legitimate. Appellant offered no explanation why he listed a false address and 
phone number in violation of Section 23-19-5. 
The Wildlife Board did not err in admitting and considering the evidence 
complained of by Appellant. The hearing was administrative where relaxed rules 
of evidence and procedure apply, the Notice of Agency Action fairly and 
adequately put Appellant on notice of the claims lodged against him, and the 
evidence was relevant to the issues before the Wildlife Board. 
C. The Wildlife Board Did Not Consider Matters Beyond the Scope of 
the Division's Administrative Decision. 
Appellant asserts the Wildlife Board erroneously admitted and considered 
the evidence discussed in Section II. B. of this Brief since it was outside the 
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Division's administrative decision. This assertion is simply inaccurate. The 
Division's January 2, 2001 administrative decision suspending Appellant's big 
game hunting privileges for a period of five years makes the following findings 
and conclusions: 1) Appellant obtained an Idaho drivers license and claimed to 
be an Idaho resident for purposes of hunting and fishing; 2) he was domiciled in 
Utah; 3) he applied for and obtained in 1997 a Utah nonresident limited entry bull 
elk license; 4) he took a six point bull elk in 1997; 5) he was prosecuted and 
convicted in Idaho for purchasing resident hunting licenses; and 6) he obtained 
the Utah 1997 nonresident limited entry bull elk license by fraud, deceit and 
misrepresentation in violation of Section § 23-19-5. (R. 18). 
The evidence complained of by Appellant was all referenced in the 
Division's January 2, 2001 administrative decision. Furthermore, the evidence 
was relevant to the Wildlife Board's decision and properly considered for the 
same reasons specified in Section II. B. of this Brief. The Wildlife Board's formal 
de novo hearing on the Division's decision reviewed its findings and conclusions 
and strictly confined itself to the matters specified therein in accordance with 
Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-9(12)(b) and Utah Admin. Code R657-26-8(8). 
III. THE WILDLIFE BOARD PROPERLY FOUND APPELLANT'S CONDUCT 
KNOWING AND FLAGRANT. 
Appellant challenges two aspects of the Wildlife Board's determination 
that his conduct in unlawfully acquiring a 1997 Utah nonresident limited entry 
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bull elk license was knowing and flagrant. First, the Wildlife Board is charged 
with error in relying upon the definition of "knowingly" found in Utah Admin. Code 
R657-26-2(2)(b) (1999). Second, the Wildlife Board is charged with having 
insufficient evidence in the record to conclude Appellant's conduct was knowing 
and flagrant. 
A. The Definition of "Knowingly" in Utah Administrative Code R657-26-
2(2)(b) Should be Sustained as Valid. 
Appellant correctly notes the definition of "knowingly" in Utah Admin. Code 
R657-26-2(2)(b) is not identical to the definition of "knowingly" in the criminal 
code, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(2) (1995). The assertion that this difference in 
definition is reversible error, however, was not raised to the Wildlife Board at 
hearing and is substantively without merit in any event. 
1. Appellant Waived the Right to Challenge the Validity of Utah 
Administrative Code R657-26-2(2)(b) by Failing to Raise the 
Matter at His Hearing with the Wildlife Board. 
Appellant's challenge to the definition of "knowingly" found in Utah Admin. 
Code R657-26-2(2)(b) was not raised or argued to the Wildlife Board at the 
hearing on May 17, 2001. Three references exist in the entire record relating to 
this matter: 1) Appellant's Demand for the Return of Personal Property filed with 
the Division (R. 37) attaches copies of the relevant code and rule provisions 
without discussion or argument (R. 41); 2) the same Demand appearing as an 
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Exhibit to the Wildlife Board hearing6 (R. 113, 117); and 3) Appellant's written 
Appeal to the Wildlife Board from the Division's January 2, 2001 decision briefly 
raises the issue. (R. 13). Nevertheless, the matter is never raised, discussed or 
argued to the Wildlife Board at its May 17, 2001 hearing by Appellant or anyone 
else. 
As stated in Section I of this Brief, "[t]he general rule is that objections or 
questions not raised or urged in an agency proceeding are deemed waived and 
will not be considered by a court on review." Esquivel. 7 P.3d at 783; Brown & 
Root Indus. Service. 947 P.2d at 677; Alvin G. Rhodes Pump Sales. 681 P.2d at 
1249. The fact Appellant challenged the definition of "knowingly" in his written 
appeal to the Wildlife Board does not itself entitle him to raise the issue now on 
appeal. The Utah Supreme Court in Zions First National Bank v. National 
American Title Insurance Company. 749 P.2d 651, 657 (Utah 1988) held that a 
defense raised in pleadings but not argued to the trial court is waived on appeal. 
"This Court will not consider on appeal issues which were not submitted to the 
trial court and concerning which the trial court did not have the opportunity to 
make any findings of fact or law." ]cL (quoting Turtle Management. Inc. v. 
Haggis Management. Inc.. 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982)). 
6
 This document was admitted upon Appellant's request to make all the 
Division hearing officer's file an exhibit in the Wildlife Board hearing. (R. 118 at 
58). No further discussion took place at the Wildlife Board hearing regarding it. 
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Likewise, Appellant's challenge to the definition of "knowingly" found in 
Utah Admin. Code R657-26-2(2)(b) should not be considered on appeal since it 
was not raised at the Wildlife Board hearing on May 17, 2001. 
2. Alternatively, the Definition of "Knowingly" in Utah 
Administrative Code R657-26-2(2Vb) is Valid. 
Ordinarily, the standard of review under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) 
(1997) for an agency's interpretation of statute is a correction-of-error standard. 
Uintah Oil Assoc. 853 P.2d at 896. However, the Legislature often grants 
agencies explicit or implicit discretion in dealing with statutory terms. Morton. 
814 P.2d at 588. In such instances, an agency's interpretation of a statute is 
granted deference by the reviewing court, i d Agency discretion in interpreting 
a statute may be implied where the statutory language suggests the Legislature 
left the question at issue unresolved, or where "there is more than one 
permissible reading of the statute and no basis in the statutory language or 
legislative history to prefer one interpretation over another." ]g\ 
The Division and Wildlife Board are granted authority to administratively 
suspend or revoke hunting and fishing privileges where a person is convicted of 
violating a provision of Title 23 and found to have committed the violation 
"flagrantly and knowingly." See Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-9(1) and (5) (1998). 
The terms "flagrantly" and "knowingly" are not defined in Title 23 of the Utah 
Code nor are they linked to any other definition in the Utah Code. Specifically, 
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the term "knowingly" is not linked or otherwise referenced to the definition found 
in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(2). The definition in Section 76-2-103(2) 
describes "knowingly" in the context of criminal culpability while Utah Code Ann. 
§ 23-19-9(1 )(a) uses the word to articulate an element for administrative license 
suspensions. The mere fact the term appears in both contexts does not itself 
establish the Legislature's intent for it to share a common definition. Indeed, 
there is no evidence in Title 23 of the Utah Code or elsewhere suggesting such 
an intent. 
Instead, the Legislature manifested its intent in Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-
9(13) for the Wildlife Board to flesh out the procedural and substantive details of 
the license suspension process. "The Wildlife Board may make rules to 
implement this section in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative 
Procedures Act." kL (Emphasis added). "[I]n the absence of a discernable 
legislative intent concerning the specific question in issue, a choice among 
permissible interpretations of a statute is largely a policy determination." Morton. 
814 P.2d at 589. The Wildlife Board's determination to incorporate within the 
regulatory definition of "knowingly" an element of criminal negligence is within its 
scope of statutory authority granted in Section 23-19-9(13) and not an abuse of 
discretion. This point is particularly cogent, considering the definition is used in 
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administrative proceedings to temporarily suspend7 recreational hunting and 
fishing privileges rather than to impose fines and incarceration. The definition in 
Utah Admin. Code R657-26-2(2)(b) should be granted deference and sustained 
since "knowingly" is not defined in Title 23 of the Utah Code and is subject to 
varying interpretations. "The agency granted authority to administer the statute 
is the appropriate body to make such a determination." id. The Wildlife Board 
did not err in adopting and applying the definition of "knowingly" found in Utah 
Admin. Code R657-26-2(2)(b). 
B. The Wildlife Board's Finding that Appellant's Conduct was Knowing 
and Flagrant is Supported by Substantial Evidence and Should be 
Sustained. 
Appellant petitions this Court to set aside the factual findings of the 
Wildlife Board as not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, he asserts 
insufficient evidence was presented at the hearing for the Wildlife Board to 
conclude he knowingly and flagrantly8 purchased a Utah nonresident limited 
7
 The maximum period of time that hunting and fishing privileges may be 
suspended is five years. Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-9(8) (1998). 
8
 "'Flagrantly' means an act in violation of Title 23, Wildlife Resources 
Code committed in a manner that, in the opinion of the presiding officer, is 
conspicuously bad or offensive." Utah Admin. Code R657-26-2(2)(a) (1999). 
"'Knowingly' means, with respect to the nature or the result of a person's conduct, 
that the person was aware, or should have been aware, that the conduct was 
reasonably certain to cause the result." Utah Admin. Code R657-26-2(2)(b) 
(1999). 
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entry bull elk license in 1997 in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-5 which 
prohibits a Utah resident from purchasing a Utah nonresident license.9 Under 
Title 63, Chapter 46b of the Utah Code, administrative findings of fact should be 
affirmed where they are "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light 
of the whole record before the court." Grace Drilling Co.. 776 P.2d at 68. 
Substantial evidence is something less than the weight of the evidence but more 
than a mere scintilla. ]<1 "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." ]g\ 
Appellant carries the affirmative burden to "marshal all of the evidence 
supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light of 
the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the [Wildlife Board's] findings are not 
supported by substantial evidence." Nelson v. Department of Employment 
Security. 801 P.2d 158, 161 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Appellant fails to marshal the evidence. He identifies two points of 
evidence in support of the Wildlife Board's findings and one matter of evidence 
contradicting it. The only evidence offered in Appellant's Brief potentially 
contradicting the Wildlife Board's findings is his own self-serving statement of 
9
 Although Appellant pleaded guilty to killing a bull elk in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 23-20-4, Wanton Destruction of Protected Wildlife, the act was 
illegal on account of killing the animal with an unlawfully obtained and invalid 
nonresident license. 
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innocence. Appellant claims he was unaware that purchasing a Utah 
nonresident elk license under the circumstances was unlawful. 
On the other hand, a plethora of direct and circumstantial evidence 
demonstrates Appellant knowingly and flagrantly acquired the 1997 Utah 
nonresident license in violation of the law. 
a. Appellant has lived in Utah since 1976. (R. 118 at 68). At all 
relevant times, he was domiciled in Utah, employed in Utah, registered to vote in 
Utah, and taxed in Utah. (R. 118 at 25, 69-70). Appellant has no bona fide 
belief or claim to residency in Idaho or nonresidency in Utah. 
b. Appellant unlawfully obtained an Idaho drivers license in 1993 using 
his sister's Idaho daycare center's address to facilitate a scheme for illegally 
obtaining resident Idaho hunting licenses. (R. 118 at 22, 70). 
c. Appellant thereafter fraudulently obtained resident hunting licenses 
in Idaho. On September 23, 1999, Appellant pleaded guilty to three counts of 
illegally purchasing Idaho resident hunting licenses and was convicted of the 
same in the Seventh Judicial District Court of Idaho, Bonneville County. (R. 98 
and R. 118 at 33, 84-85). The conviction conclusively demonstrates Appellant's 
claim of residency in Idaho for purposes of hunting was fraudulent. The Idaho 
drivers license and resident Idaho hunting licenses are evidence of a scheme to 
defraud Idaho and, more particularly, Utah. 
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d. In 1997, Appellant applied for and obtained a Utah nonresident 
Book Cliffs/Bitter Creek limited entry bull elk license. (R. 118 at 23-24, 67-69). 
The application for the license prepared by Appellant identified a false Idaho 
address and phone number as his own, and an Idaho drivers license number. 
(R. 118 at 23-24, 67-69). Appellant listed the false information in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-5, which prohibits using fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation in obtaining a license and in violation of application's 
verification clause. (R. 118 at 91-92). Fraudulently listing an Idaho address, 
phone number and drivers license number on his Utah application in violation of 
the law supports the conclusion that Appellant was attempting to avoid raising 
red flags and conceal from the Division his true Utah residency status. These 
acts demonstrate Appellant understood he could not lawfully obtain a Utah 
nonresident hunting license. 
e. Appellant pleaded guilty in the Eighth Judicial District Court for 
Uintah County, State of Utah on December 15, 1999 to Wanton Destruction of 
Protected Wildlife (Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-4). (R. 96 and R. 118 at 86-87). 
The factual basis underlying the conviction was the killing of a bull elk with an 
invalid Utah nonresident license that was obtained through fraud and deceit in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-5. (R. 118 at 29-30, 52-53). "A plea of 
guilty is a confession of the correctness of the accusation which dispenses with 
the necessity of proof thereof." State v. Stewart. 110 Utah 203, 171 P.2d 383, 
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385 (Utah 1946). Appellant admitted by his guilty plea the elements of Wanton 
Destruct of Protected Wildlife, one of which is that the offense was committed 
with "intentional, knowing or reckless conduct." Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-
4(1 )(c)(i) (1998). 
Appellant's vague, self-serving and predictable defense of ignorance to 
violating any laws in Utah or elsewhere by using false information to obtain an 
Idaho drivers license, Idaho resident hunting licenses, and a Utah nonresident 
hunting license while residing in Utah lacks credibility. (R. 118 at 68-72). The 
Wildlife Board had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and judge their 
credibility and found the weight of evidence rested against Appellant's assertions 
of ignorance and good faith. Considering the administrative record as a whole, 
the Wildlife Board's conclusion that Appellant flagrantly and knowingly violated 
Section 23-19-5 in obtaining a Utah 1997 nonresident limited entry bull elk 
license is supported by substantial evidence. 
IV. APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEA IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, IS VALID AND MAY 
NOT BE CHALLENGED IN THIS PETITION FOR REVIEW. 
Appellant challenges the validity of his negotiated guilty plea to Wanton 
Destruction of Protected Wildlife, Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-4, in the Eighth 
Judicial District Court for Uintah County, State of Utah. He asserts the 
conviction is invalid because the criminal information misidentifies the actual 
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date the offense was committed, and as such, it cannot serve to form the basis 
of his hunting license suspension. 
Appellant pleaded guilty to and was convicted of Wanton Destruction of 
Protected Wildlife on December 15, 1999. (R. 96 and R. 118 at 86-87). The 
conviction is facially valid, and Appellant has never attempted to invalidate it on 
direct appeal or collaterally. (R. 118 at 87-88). 
"Administrative agencies are statutory creatures that have no more power 
than that which is expressly or impliedly granted by statute." Nielson v. Division 
ofP.O.S.T.. 851 P.2d 1201, 1204 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing Williams v. Public 
Service Commission. 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 1988)). Appellant's guilty plea is 
presumptively valid, State v. Thurston. 781 P.2d 1296, 1301 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989), and places him legally in the same position as a verdict of a jury finding 
him guilty. Stewart. 171 P.2d at 385. Neither the Division nor the Wildlife Board 
have statutory authority to invalidate Appellant's plea or to disregard it. 
Moreover, Appellant's guilty plea waives any right or opportunity he may 
have possessed to challenge any defect in the Information. "The general rule 
applicable in criminal proceedings, and the cases are legion, is that by pleading 
guilty, the defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the essential elements of 
the crime charged and thereby waives all nonjurisdictional defects... ." 
Parsons. 781 P.2d at 1278. "When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted 
in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he 
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may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of 
constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea." jd. 
Nonmaterial defects in a criminal information, such as the date of the offense, 
are nonjurisdictional and may not be raised on appeal where an objection is not 
made at the trial level. State v. Marcum. 750 P.2d 599, 601-02 (Utah 1988). "A 
[defect] is material if it actually prejudices the accused with respect to a 
substantial right, or where the information is so defective that it results in a 
miscarriage of justice." ]cL at 601. 
Appellant was fully aware when he pleaded guilty that the date of the 
charged offense occurred in the Fall of 1997. The investigation focused on one 
criminal episode of killing a six point bull elk on the Book Cliffs/Bitter Creek unit 
in 1997 with an invalid nonresident license. Appellant pleaded guilty to the 
offense, was placed on two years probation, and ordered to pay $ 5610.00 in 
restitution. (R. 96-97). Appellant admits he killed a six point bull elk in 1997 in 
Utah with a nonresident license. (R. 118 at 69). Moreover, he has never 
asserted confusion or prejudice over the substantive elements of the offense he 
pleaded guilty to in relation to the offense date specified in the criminal 
information. Indeed, Appellant acknowledges that the defective date in the 
information was an issue that no one picked up on at the hearing when he 
entered his guilty plea. (R. 118 at 50). The defective date in the information did 
not substantially prejudice Appellant or result in a miscarriage of justice. 
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Accordingly, Appellant waived his right to challenge the information when he 
pleaded guilty on December 15, 1999. 
STATEMENT CONCERNING ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
Appellee does not request oral argument or a published opinion in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the record and the foregoing arguments, Appellee respectfully 
requests this Court to affirm the Wildlife Board's September 26, 2001 Order 
suspending Appellant's big game hunting privileges for a period of five years. 
DATED this > & day of May, 2002. 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
MARTIN B. BUSHMAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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GENERAL PROVISIONS 23-13-2 
23-13-1. Short title — "Wildlife Resources Code of Utah." 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Wildlife Resources Code of 
Utah." 
History: C. 1953, 23-13-1, enacted by L. which amended §§ 23-13-3 and 23-20-25, pro-
1971, ch. 46, § 1. vides in § 3: "The Legislature finds that wild-
Meaning of "this act." — The phrase "this life is pervasively regulated for management 
act," as used in this section, means L. 1971, ch. and preservation and that the standards ar-
46, which repealed Chapters 1 to 12 and en- ticulated in this title are necessary to protect 
acted Chapters 13 to 21 and 22 of this title. this resource." 
Legislative Intent. — Laws 1994, ch. 208, 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Fish and C.J.S. — 36A C.J.S. Fish § 1 et seq.; 38 
Game § 1 et seq. C.J.S. Game § 1 et seq. 
23-13-2. Definitions. 
As used in this title: 
(1) "Activity regulated under this title" means any act, attempted act, or 
activity prohibited or regulated under any provision of Title 23 or the 
















(n) utilizing as a commercial venture; and 
(o) releasing to the wild. 
(2) "Aquatic animal" has the meaning provided in Section 4-37-103. 
(3) "Aquatic wildlife" means species of fish, mollusks, crustaceans, 
aquatic insects, or amphibians. 
(4) "Aquaculture facility" has the meaning provided in Section 4-37-103. 
(5) "Bag limit" means the maximum limit, in number or amount, of 
protected wildlife that one person may legally take during one day. 
(6) "Big game" means species of hoofed protected wildlife. 
(7) "Carcass" means the dead body of an animal or its parts. 
(8) "Certificate of registration" means a document issued under this 
title, or any rule or proclamation of the Wildlife Board granting authority 
to engage in activities not covered by a license, permit, or tag. 
(9) "Closed season" means the period of time during which the taking of 
protected wildlife is prohibited. 
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(10) "Conservation officer" means a full-time, permanent employee of 
the Division of Wildlife Resources who is POST certified as a peace or a 
special function officer. 
(11) "Division'5 means the Division of Wildlife Resources. 
(12) (a) "Domicile" means the place: 
(i) where an individual has a fixed permanent home and 
principal establishment; 
(ii) to which the individual if absent, intends to return; and 
(iii) in which the individual and the individual's family volun-
tarily reside, not for a special or temporary purpose, but with the 
intention of making a permanent home. 
(b) To create a new domicile an individual must: 
(i) abandon the old domicile; and 
(ii) be able to prove that a new domicile has been established. 
(13) "Endangered" means wildlife designated as such pursuant to 
Section 3 of the federal Endangered Species Act of 1973. 
(14) "Fee fishing facility" has the meaning provided in Section 4-37-103. 
(15) "Feral" means an animal which is normally domesticated but has 
reverted to the wild. 
(16) "Fishing" means to take fish or crayfish by any means. 
(17) "Furbearer" means species of the Bassariscidae, Canidae, Felidae, 
Mustelidae, and Castoridae families, except coyote and cougar. 
(18) "Game" means wildlife normally pursued, caught, or taken by 
sporting means for human use. 
(19) (a) "Guide" means a person who receives compensation or adver-
tises services for assisting another person to take protected wildlife. 
(b) Assistance under Subsection (a) includes the provision of food, 
shelter, or transportation, or any combination of these. 
(20) "Guide's agent" means a person who is employed by a guide to 
assist another person to take protected wildlife. 
(21) "Hunting" means to take or pursue a reptile, amphibian, bird, or 
mammal by any means. 
(22) "Intimidate or harass" means to physically interfere with or 
impede, hinder, or diminish the efforts of an officer in the performance of 
the officer's duty. 
(23) "License" means the primary document granting authority to 
engage in activities under: 
(a) this title; or 
(b) a rule or proclamation of the Wildlife Board. 
(24) "Nonresident" means a person who does not qualify as a resident. 
(25) "Open season" means the period of time during which protected 
wildlife may be legally taken. 
(26) "Pecuniary gain" means the acquisition of money or something of 
monetary value. 
(27) "Permit" means a secondary document, including a stamp, which: 
(a) requires a license as a prerequisite to its issuance; and 
(b) grants authority to engage in specified activities under this title 
or a rule or proclamation of the Wildlife Board. 
(28) "Person" means an individual, association, partnership, govern-
ment agency, corporation, or an agent of the foregoing. 
(29) "Possession" means actual or constructive possession. 
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(30) "Possession limit" means the number of bag limits one individual 
may legally possess. 
(31) (a) "Private fish installation" means a body of water where pri-
vately owned, protected aquatic wildlife are propagated or kept. 
(b) "Private fish installation" does not include any aquaculture 
facility or fee fishing facility. 
(32) "Private wildlife farm" means an enclosed place where privately 
owned birds or furbearers are propagated or kept and which restricts the 
birds or furbearers from: 
(a) commingling with wild birds or furbearers; and 
(b) escaping into the wild. 
(33) "Proclamation" means the publication used to convey a statute, 
rule, polic}', or pertinent information as it relates to wildlife. 
(34) (a) "Protected aquatic wildlife" means aquatic wildlife as defined 
in Subsection (3), except as provided in Subsection (b). 
(b) "Protected aquatic wildlife" does not include aquatic insects. 
(35) (a) "Protected wildlife" means wildlife as defined in Subsection 
(49), except as provided in Subsection (b). 
(b) "Protected wildlife" does not include coyote, field mouse, gopher, 
ground squirrel, jack rabbit, muskrat, and raccoon. 
(36) "Released to the wild" means to turn loose from confinement. 
(37) (a) "Resident" means a person who: 
(i) has been domiciled in the state of Utah for six consecutive 
months immediately preceding the purchase of a license; and 
(ii) does not claim residency for hunting, fishing, or trapping in 
any other state or country. 
(b) A Utah resident retains Utah residency if that person leaves 
this state: 
(i) to serve in the armed forces of the United States or for 
religious or educational purposes; and 
(ii) complies with Subsection (a)(ii). 
(c) (i) A member of the armed forces of the United States and 
dependents are residents for the purposes of this chapter as of the 
date the member reports for duty under assigned orders in the 
state if the member: 
(A) is not on temporary duty in this state; and 
(B) complies with Subsection (a)(ii). 
(ii) A copy of the assignment orders must be presented to a 
wildlife division office to verify the member's qualification as a 
resident. 
(d) A nonresident attending an institution of higher learning in this 
state as a full-time student may qualify as a resident for purposes of 
this chapter if the student: 
(i) has been present in this state for 60 consecutive days 
immediately preceding the purchase of the license; and 
(ii) complies with Subsection (a)(ii). 
(e) A Utah resident license is invalid if a resident license for 
hunting, fishing, or trapping is purchased in any other state or 
country. 
(f) An absentee landowner paying property tax on land in Utah 
does not qualify as a resident. 
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(38) "Sell" means to offer or possess for sale, barter, exchange, or trad<\ 
or the act of selling, bartering, exchanging, or trading. 
(39) "Small game" means species of protected wildlife: 
(a) commonly pursued for sporting purposes; and 
(b) not classified as big game, aquatic wildlife, or furbearers. 
(40) "Spoiled" means impairment of the flesh of wildlife which renders 
it unfit for human consumption. 
(41) "Spotlighting" means throwing or casting the rays of any spotlight, 
headlight, or other artificial light on any highway or in any field, 
woodland, or forest while having in possession a weapon by which 
protected wildlife may be killed. 
(42) "Tag" means a card, label, or other identification device issued for 
attachment to the carcass of protected wildlife. 
(43) "Take" means to: 
(a) hunt, pursue, harass, catch, capture, possess, angle, seine, trap, 
or kill any protected wildlife; or 
(b) attempt any action referred to in Subsection (a). 
(44) "Threatened" means wildlife designated as such pursuant to Sec-
tion 3 of the federal Endangered Species Act of 1973. 
(45) "Trapping" means taking protected wildlife with a trapping device. 
(46) "Trophy animal" means an animal described as follows: 
(a) deer — any buck with an outside antler measurement of 24 
inches or greater; 
(b) elk — any bull with six points on at least one side; 
(c) bighorn, desert, or rocky mountain sheep — any ram with a cur) 
exceeding half curl; 
(d) moose — any bull; 
(e) mountain goat — any male or female; 
(f) pronghorn antelope — any buck with horns exceeding 14 inches; 
or 
(g) bison — any bull. 
(47) "Waste" means to abandon protected wildlife or to allow protected 
wildlife to spoil or to be used in a manner not normally associated with its 
beneficial use. 
(48) "Water pollution" means the introduction of matter or thermal 
energy to waters within this state which: 
(a) exceeds state water quality standards; or 
(b) could be harmful to protected wildlife. 
(49) "Wildlife" means: 
(a) crustaceans, including brine shrimp and crayfish; 
(b) mollusks; and 
(c) vertebrate animals living in nature, except feral animals. 
History: C. 1953, 23-13-2, enacted by L. 
1971, ch. 46, § 2; 1973, ch. 33, § 1; 1975, ch. 
60, § 1; 1977, ch. 102, § 1; 1979, ch. 90, § 1; 
1981, ch. 112, § 1; 1981, ch. 115, § 1; 1983, 
ch. 123, § 1; 1986, ch. 76, § 1; 1991, ch. 5, 
§ 31; 1991, ch. 212, § 1; 1992, ch. 27, § 1; 
1993, ch. 234, § 15; 1993, ch. 307, § 1; 1994, 
ch. 153, $ 29; 1994, ch. 208, § 1; 1995, ch. 
211, § 1; 1996, ch. 265, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment by ch. 208, effective May 2, 1994, added 
Subsection (1), defining "activity regulated un-
der this title/5 and made related designation 
and reference changes, made several stylistic-
changes making language gender-neutral, and 
corrected an internal reference. 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 153, effective 
July 3, 3994, added definitions of "aquatic ani 
mal," "aquaculture facility," and "fee fishing 
facility." renumbering the existing subsections 
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uccordingly and making related internal refer-
ence changes; added "moJlusk'' to the list of 
^aquatic wildlife*'; inserted ^or crayfish" in the 
definition of "fishing"; added the (a) designation 
in Subsection (30) and added Subsection 
(30)(b); and added Subsection (47)(b), redesig-
nating former Subsection (47)(b) as (c) and 
making related changes. 
The 3995 amendment, effective May 1, 3995, 
deleted "or Board of Big Game Control" after 
"Wildlife Board" in three places and made a 
stylistic change. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
State waters. Utah 382, 343 R2d 386 (3943), rehearing de-
b a t e r s of this state" meant waters of public nied, 305 Utah 393, 345 R2d 784 (3944) (de-
streams of state or water flowing in natural cided under former similar provisions), 
channels. State v. California Packing Corp., 305 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 36A C.J.S. Fish § 3; 38 C.J.S. 
Game, Conservation and Preservation of Wild-
life § 2. 
23-33-3. Wildlife declared property of the state. 
All wildlife existing within this state, not held by private ownership and 
legally acquired, is the property of the state. 
History: C. 3953, 23-13-3, enacted by L. 
1971, ch. 46, § 3; 1992, ch. 27, § 2. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Fish and Game, Conservation and Preservation of Wild-
Game § 1. life § 3. 
C.J.S. — 36A C.J.S. Fish § 2; 38 C.J.S. 
23-13-4. Captivity of protected wildlife unlawful. 
It is unlawful for any person to hold in captivity at any time any protected 
wildlife except as provided by this code or rules and regulations of the Wildlife 
Board. 
History: C. 1953, 23-13-4, enacted by L. 
1971, ch. 46, § 4. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Fish and tion of state wildlife possession laws, 50 
Game § 40. A.L.R.5th 703. 
A.L.R. — Validity, construction, and applica-
The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 
1996, added Subsection (46), redesignating the 
other subsections accordingly, and in Subsec-
tion (35)(a) substituted "Subsection (49)" for 
"Subsection (48).* 
Federal Law. — Section 3 of the federal 
Endangered Species Act of 1973, cited in Sub-
sections (13) and (44), which defines "endan-
gered speciesr and "threatened species," is codi-
fied as 16 U.S.C. § 1532. 
LICENSES, PERMITS AND TAGS 23-19-5 
transporting wildlife or taking a deer for a blind 1999, rewrote Subsection (3) which read "The 
person" from the end of Subsection (2)(a)(ii), Wildlife Board may establish each year a free 
and added Subsection (2Kb). fishing day under rules prescribed by the 
The 1998 amendment, effective January 1, board." 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Fish and Game, Conservation and Preservation of Wild-
Game § 45. life § 51 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 36A C.J.S. Fish § 36; 38 C.J.S. 
23-19-2. License and certificate forms prescribed by Wild-
life Board. 
(1) The Wildlife Board shall prescribe the form of license or certificate of 
registration to be used for hunting, fishing, trapping, seining, and dealing in 
furs. 
(2) Any license issued pursuant to Section 23-19-36 or 23-19-37 shall be 
designated as such by a code number and shall contain no reference to the 
licensee's disability. 
History: C. 1953, 23-19-2, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
1971, ch. 46, § 66; 1980, ch. 28, § 3; 1983, ch. ment, effective April 29, 1996, added Subsec-
126, § 2; 1996, ch. 145, § 1. tion (2) and made a related change. 
23-19-3. Special tags as supplements to licenses and per-
mits. 
The division may issue, as supplements to appropriate licenses and permits, 
special tags for protected wildlife, as determined by the Wildlife Board. 
History: C. 1953, 23-19-3, enacted by L. ment, effective May 1, 1995, deleted "or the 
1971, ch. 46, § 67; 1985, ch. 124, § 1; 1993, Board of Big Game Control" after "Wildlife 
ch. 178, § 2; 1995, ch. 211, § 16. Board." 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
23-19-4. Alien's right to licenses and certificates. 
An alien resident of the State of Utah may purchase hunting, fishing, 
trapping, seining, and fur dealer licenses and certificates of registration upon 
the same terms as a resident citizen. All nonresident aliens may purchase 
hunting, fishing, trapping, seining, and fur dealer licenses and certificates of 
registration upon the same terms as nonresident citizens. 
History: C. 1953, 23-19-4, enacted by L. 
1971, ch. 46, § 68; 1980, ch. 28, § 4; 1983, ch. 
126, § 3. 
23-19-5. Fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in obtaining 
a license, permit, tag, or certificate of registra-
tion unlawful — Violation — Penalty. 
It is unlawful for any person to obtain or attempt to obtain a license, permit, 
tag. or certificate of registration by fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. It is 
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unlawful for a nonresident to purchase a resident license. It is unlawful for a 
resident to purchase a nonresident license. Any person violating provisions of 
this section is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953, 23-19-5, enacted by L. Cross-Reference6. — Sentencing for misde-
3971, ch. 46, § 69; 1975, ch. 60, § 8; 1979, ch. meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
90, § 6; 1986, ch. 76, § 8. 
23-19-6. Imitating or counterfeiting license unlawful — 
Violation — Penalty. 
It is unlawful to imitate or counterfeit any license, permit, tag, or certificate 
of registration for the purpose of defrauding the state of Utah or for evading 
the purposes and provisions of this code. Any person who violates any provision 
of this section is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953, 23-19-6, enacted by L. Cross-References.— Sentencing for misde-
1971, ch. 46, § 70; 1979, ch. 90, § 7. meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
23-19-7. Licenses issued annually — Exception — Expira-
tion date. 
The licenses required by this chapter, except lifetime licenses, shall be issued 
annually and shall expire on December 31st each year. 
History: C. 1953, 23-19-7, enacted by L. 
1971, ch. 46, § 71; 1973, ch. 33, § 7; 1975, ch. 
61, § 1; 1984, ch. 30, § 1. 
23-19-8. Signature on documents — Deemed under oath 
— Prohibition on use of unsigned documents. 
(1) A person's signature on a license, permit, tag, certificate of registration, 
or habitat authorization is certification of that person's eligibility to use the 
license, permit, tag, certificate of registration, or habitat authorization for the 
purpose intended by this title. 
(2) The signature need not be notarized but shall be considered to be made 
under oath. 
(3) A person may not use an unsigned license, permit, tag, certificate of 
registration, or habitat authorization. 
History: C. 1953, 23-19-8, enacted by L. tag, certificate of registration, or habitat autho-
1971, ch. 46, § 72; 1976, ch. 60, § 9; l979,ch. rization" in three places, deleted a provision 
90, § 8; 1996, ch. 145, § 2. making violation of the section a misdemeanor, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend- and made several stylistic changes, 
ment, effective April 29, 1996 inserted "permit, 
23-19-9. Revocation of license — Grounds — Notice — 
Restriction on obtaining new license. 
(1) A license, permit, tag, or certificate of registration shall be revoked by a 
hearing officer appointed by the division director: 
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(a) if the hearing officer determines that a person flagrantly and 
knowingly: 
(i) violates or countenances the violation of: 
(A) this title; or 
(B) any rule, proclamation, or order of the Wildlife Board; or 
(ii) while engaged in an activity regulated under this title: 
(A) kills or injures domestic livestock; or 
(B) violates Section 76-10-508; or 
(b) upon receiving notice from another state's wildlife agency that a 
person has: 
(i) failed to comply with the terms of a wildlife citation; or 
(ii) been convicted of a violation that would warrant an action 
taken under Subsection (l)(a). 
(2) A hearing officer may revoke or suspend the certificate of registration of 
a person who fails to comply with the terms of a certificate of registration. 
(3) All certificates of registration for the harvesting of brine shrimp eggs, as 
defined in Section 59-23-3, shall be revoked by a hearing officer appointed by 
the division if the hearing officer determines the holder of the certificates of 
registration has violated Section 59-23-5. 
(4) The director shall appoint a qualified person as a hearing officer to 
perform the adjudicative functions provided in this section. The director may 
not appoint a division employee who investigates or enforces wildlife viola-
tions. 
(5) (a) A hearing officer may not revoke a person's license, permit, tag, or 
certificate of registration if: 
(i) the person was not charged with a violation in Subsection (1) or 
(3); 
(ii) the charges were dismissed; or 
(iii) the person was found not guilty of the violation in a court of 
law. 
(b) For purposes of this section, the following shall not be construed as 
a finding of not guilty: 
(i) a plea of guilty; 
(ii) a plea of no contest; or 
(iii) the entry of a plea in abeyance. 
(6) The hearing officer shall consider any recommendation made by a 
sentencing court concerning revocation before issuing a revocation order. 
(7) Prior to revocation, a person must be: 
(a) given written notice of an action the division intends to take; and 
(b) provided with an opportunity for a hearing. 
(8) A hearing officer may prohibit the person from obtaining a new license, 
permit, tag, or certificate of registration of the same type for a period of up to 
five years. 
(9) (a) A person may not obtain a new license, permit, tag, or certificate of 
registration of the same type while under an order of revocation. 
(b) A violation of Subsection (9)(a) is a class B misdemeanor and a 
hearing officer shall prohibit the person from obtaining a license, permit, 
tag, or certificate of registration of the same type for up to an additional 
five years. 
(10) A hearing officer may construe any subsequent conviction which occurs 
within the revocation period as a flagrant violation and may prohibit the 
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person from obtaining a new license, permit, tag, or certificate of registration 
for up to an additional five years. 
(11) A hearing officer may reinstate a license, permit, tag, or certificate of 
registration revoked under Subsection (l)(b)(i) upon receiving a report that the 
person has complied with the citation. 
(12) (a) A person may file an appeal of a hearing officer's decision with the 
Wildlife Board. 
(b) The Wildlife Board shall review the hearing officer's findings and 
conclusions and any written documentation submitted at the hearing. The 
Wildlife Board may: 
(i) take no action; 
(ii) vacate or remand the decision; or 
(iii) amend the period of revocation. 
(13) The Wildlife Board may make rules to implement this section in 
accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
History: C. 1953, 23-19-9, enacted by L. May 1,1995, deleted "or the Board of Big Game 
1971, ch. 46, § 72; 1983, ch. 126, § 5; 1991, Control" after "Wildlife Board* in Subsection 
ch. 212, § 4; 1992, ch. 260, § 1; 1995, ch. 63, (l)(a) and made a stylistic change. 
§ 1; 1995, ch. 211, § 17; 1997, ch. 179, § 1; The 1997 amendment, effective May 5,1997, 
1998, ch. 13, § 18. added Subsection (3), redesignating eubsec-
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- tions accordingly; added "or (3)" to the end of 
ment by ch. 63, effective May 1, 1995, rewrote Subsection (5)(a)(i); and substituted "period"for 
this section, substituting the references to the "number of years'' in Subsection (12XbXiii). 
"hearing officer" for the "Wildlife Board" The ^ 998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, 
throughout, adding Subsections (l)(a)(ii), (2), substituted "Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative 
(3), (4)(aXi) and (ii), (4Kb), (5), (8), (11), and (12), Rulemaking Act" for "Chapter 46b, Administra-
and making numerous related and stylistic tive Procedures Act" in Subsection (13). 
changes. Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
The 1995 amendment by ch. 211, effective meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
23-19-9.1. Court-ordered action against a license. 
The division shall promptly withhold, suspend, restrict, or reinstate the use 
of a license issued under this chapter if so ordered by a court. 
History: C. 1953, 23-19-9,1, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 232, 
1997, ch. 232, § 1. § 142 makes the act effective on July 1, 1997. 
23-19-9.5. Warrant outstanding or failure to comply with 
citation — Person not entitled to license, permit, 
tag, or certificate. 
(1) A person may not purchase a license, permit, tag, or certificate of 
registration if: 
(a) there is an outstanding Utah warrant against him for failure to 
appear in answer to a summons for a violation of: 
(i) a provision of this title; or 
(ii) a rule, proclamation, or order of the Wildlife Board; or 
(b) he has failed to comply with a wildlife citation in a state which is a 
party to the Wildlife Violator Compact set forth in Title 23, Chapter 25. 
(2) The division may allow a person referred to in Subsection (1) to purchase 
a license, permit, tag, or certificate of registration if satisfactory proof is given 
that: 
662 
ENFORCEMENT — VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES 23-20-4 
State v. Chindgren, 777 P.2d 527 (Utah Ct. App. ducks was sufficient to support his conviction 
1989). for violating § 23-13-3. State v. Chindgren, 777 
Evidence showing that defendant acted reck- P.2d 527 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
lessly in releasing a falcon in a field full of 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Fish and A.L.R.— Validity and construction of statute 
Game §§ 45, 50. prohibiting sale within state of skin or body of 
C.J.S. — 36A C.J.S. Fish §§ 29, 36; 38 C.J.S. specified wild animals or of the animal itself, 44 
Game, Conservation and Preservation of Wild- A.L.R.3d 1008. 
life §§ 45 to 58, 74 et seq. 
23-20-4. Wanton destruction of protected wildlife — Pen-
alties. 
(1) A person is guilty of wanton destruction of protected wildlife if he: 
(a) commits an act in violation of Section 23-13-4, 23-13-5, 23-13-13, 
23-15-6 through 23-15-9, 23-16-5, or Subsection 23-20-3(1); 
(b) captures, injures, or destroys protected wildlife; and 
(c) (i) does so with intentional, knowing, or reckless conduct as defined 
in Section 76-2-103; 
(ii) intentionally abandons protected wildlife or a carcass; 
(iii) commits the offense at night with the use of a weapon; 
(iv) is under a court or division revocation of a license, tag, permit, 
or certificate of registration? or 
(v) acts for pecuniary gain. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to actions taken which are in accordance 
with the following: 
(a) Title 4, Chapter 14, Utah Pesticide Control Act; 
(b) Title 4, Chapter 23, Agriculture and Wildlife Damage Prevention 
Act; or 
(c) Section 23-16-3. 
(3) Wanton destruction of wildlife is punishable: 
(a) as a third degree felony if: 
(i) the aggregate value of the protected wildlife determined by the 
values in Subsection 23-20-4(4) is more than $500; or 
(ii) a trophy animal was captured, injured, or destroyed; 
(b) as a class A misdemeanor if the aggregate value of the protected 
wildlife, other than any trophy animal, determined by the values estab-
lished in Subsection 23-20-4(4) is more than $250, but does not exceed 
$500; 
(c) as a class B misdemeanor if the aggregate value of the protected 
wildlife determined by the values established in Subsection 23-20-4(4) is 
$250 or less. 
(4) Regardless of the restitution amounts imposed under Subsection 23-20-
4.5(2), the following values shall be assigned to protected wildlife for the 
purpose of determining the offense for wanton destruction of wildlife: 
(a) $1,000 per animal for: 
(i) bison; 
(ii) bighorn sheep; 
(iii) rocky mountain goat; 
(iv) moose; 
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(v) bear; or 
(vi) endangered species; 
(b) $750 per animal for: 
(i) elk; or 
(ii) threatened species; 
(c) $500 per animal for: 
(i) cougar; 
(ii) golden eagle; 
(iii) river otter; or 
(iv) gila monster; 
(d) $400 per animal for: 
(i) pronghorn antelope; or 
(ii) deer; 
(e) $350 per animal for bobcat; 
(f) $100 per animal for: 
(i) swan; 






(viii) raptors, except those that are threatened or endangered; 
(ix) Utah milk snake; or 
(x) Utah mountain king snake; 
(g) $35 per animal for furbearers, except: 
(i) bobcat: 
(ii) river otter; and 
(iii) threatened or endangered species; 
(h) $15 per animal for game birds, except: 
(i) turkey; 
(ii) swan; and 
(iii) sandhill crane; 
(i) $10 per animal for game fish; 
(j) $8 per pound dry weight of processed brine shrimp including eggs; 
and 
(k) $5 per animal for protected wildlife not listed. 
(5) For purposes of sentencing for a wildlife violation, a person who has been 
convicted of a third degree felony under Subsection (3)(a) is not subject to the 
mandatory sentencing requirements prescribed in Subsection 76-3-203(4). 
(6) As part of any sentence imposed, the court shall impose a sentence of 
incarceration of not less than 20 consecutive days for any person convicted of 
a third degree felony under Subsection (3)(a)(ii) who captured, injured, or 
destroyed a trophy animal for pecuniary gain. 
(7) If a person has already been convicted of a third degree felony under 
Subsection (3)(a)(ii) once, each separate further offense under Subsection 
(3)(a)(ii) is punishable by, as part of any sentence imposed, a sentence of 
incarceration of not less than 20 consecutive days. 
(8) The court may not sentence a person subject to Subsection (6) or (7) to 
less than 20 consecutive days of incarceration or suspend the imposition of the 
sentence unless the court finds mitigating circumstances justifying lesser 
punishment and makes that finding a part of the court record. 
ENFORCEMENT — VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES 23-20-4.5 
History: C. 1953, 23-20-4, enacted by L. The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 
1992, ch. 27, § 4; 3 993, ch. 4, § 65; 3 993, ch. 1996, added Subsections OXaXii) and (6) to (8), 
178, § 3; 1995, ch. 63, § 2; 1996, ch. 265, § 2. making related changes; in Subsection (3Xb) 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws added "other than any trophy aniinar; in Sub-
1992, ch. 27, § 4 repeals former § 23-20-4, as section (4) added "gila monster," "Utah milk 
last emended by L. 1979, ch. 90, § 11, regard- snake* and "Utah mountain king snake* to the 
ing possession of illegally taken protected wild- list of protected wildlife and moved "cougar" 
life, and enacts the present section, effective from the list of "$1,000 per animal" to "$500 per 
April 27, 1992. animal"; and made stylistic changes. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- Cross-References. — Sentencing for felo-
ment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted "divi- nies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301. 
sion" for "Wildlife Board" in Subsection Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 
(D(cXiv). 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Our. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Fish and Game, Conservation and Preservation of Wild-
Game §§ 50, 54. life §§ 51 to 59, 74 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 36A C.J.S. Fish §§ 29,42; 38 C.J.S. 
23-20-4.5. Illegal taking, possession, or wanton destruc-
tion of protected wildlife — Restitution — Reim-
bursable damages —Assessment by magistrates 
— Disposition of monies. 
(1) When a person is adjudged guilty of illegal taking, illegal possession, or 
wanton destruction of protected wildlife, other than any trophy animal, the 
court may order the defendant to pay restitution as set forth in Subsection (2). 
or a greater or lesser amount, for the value of each animal taken, possessed, or 
destroyed, unless the court finds that restitution is inappropriate. 
(2) Suggested minimum restitution values for protected wildlife are as 
follows: 
(a) $1,000 per animal for: 
(i) bison; 
(ii) bighorn sheep; 
(iii) rocky mountain goat; 
(iv) moose; 
(v) bear; or 
(vi) endangered species; 
(b) $750 per animal for: 
(i) elk; or 
(ii) threatened species; 
(c) $500 per animal for: 
(i) cougar; 
(ii) golden eagle; 
(iii) river otter; or 
(iv) gila monster; 
(d) $400 per animal for: 
(i) pronghorn antelope; or 
(ii) deer; 
(e) $350 per animal for bobcat; 
(f) $100 per animal for: 
(i) swan; 
(ii) sandhill crane; 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT 63-46b-3 
(2) This section does not prohibit an agency from designating by rule the 
names or titles of the agency head or the presiding officers with responsibility 
for adjudicative proceedings before the agency. 
History: C. ]953, 63-46b-2, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 361, S 258; 1988, eh. ]69, § 42. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attor-
ney, 818 R2d 23 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
63-46b-3. Commencement of adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) Except as otherwise permitted by Section 63-46b-20, all adjudicative 
proceedings shall be commenced by either: 
(a) a notice of agency action, if proceedings are commenced by the 
agency; or 
(b) a request for agency action, if proceedings are commenced by 
persons other than the agency. 
(2) A notice of agency action shall be filed and served, according to the 
following requirements: 
(a) The notice of agency action shall be in writing, signed by a presiding 
officer, and shall include: 
(i) the names and mailing addresses of all persons to whom notice 
is being given by the presiding officer, and the name, title, and mailing 
address of any attorney or employee who has been designated to 
appear for the agency; 
(ii) the agency's file number or other reference number; 
(iii) the name of the adjudicative proceeding: 
(iv) the date that the notice of agency action was mailed; 
(v) a statement of whether the adjudicative proceeding is to be 
conducted informally according to the provisions of rules adopted 
under Sections 63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5, or formally according to the 
provisions of Sections 63-46b-6 to 63-46b-ll; 
(vi) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, a statement that 
each respondent must file a written response within 30 days of the 
mailing date of the notice of agency action; 
(vii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, or if a hearing is 
required by statute or rule, a statement of the time and place of any 
scheduled hearing, a statement of the purpose for which the hearing 
is to be held, and a statement that a party who fails to attend or 
participate in the hearing may be held in default; 
(viii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be informal and a hearing 
is required by statute or rule, or if a hearing is permitted by rule and 
may be requested by a party within the time prescribed by rule, a 
statement that the parties may request a hearing within the time 
provided by the agency's rules; 
(ix) a statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which 
the adjudicative proceeding is to be maintained; 
(x) the name, title, mailing address, and telephone number of the 
presiding officer; and 
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(xi) a statement of the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding and, 
to the extent known by the presiding officer, the questions to be 
decided, 
(b) When adjudicative proceedings are commenced by the agency, the 
agency shall: 
(i) mail the notice of agency action to each party; 
(ii) publish the notice of agency action, if required by statute; and 
(iii) mail the notice of agency action to any other person who has a 
right to notice under statute or rule. 
(3) (a) Where the law applicable to the agency permits persons other than 
the agency to initiate adjudicative proceedings, that person's request for 
agency action shall be in writing and signed by the person invoking the 
jurisdiction of the agency, or by his representative, and shall include: 
(i) the names and addresses of all persons to whom a copy of the 
request for agency action is being sent; 
(ii) the agency's file number or other reference number, if known; 
(iii) the date that the request for agency action was mailed; 
(iv) a statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which 
agency action is requested; 
(v) a statement of the relief or action sought from the agency; and 
(vi) a statement of the facts and reasons forming the basis for relief 
or agency action. 
(b) The person requesting agency action shall file the request with the 
agency and shall send a copy by mail to each person known to have a direct 
interest in the requested agency action. 
(c) An agency may, by rule, prescribe one or more printed forms eliciting 
the information required by Subsection (3)(a) to serve as the request for 
agency action when completed and filed by the person requesting agency 
action. 
(d) The presiding officer shall promptly review a request for agency 
action and shall: 
(i) notify the requesting party in writing that the request is granted 
and that the adjudicative proceeding is completed; 
(ii) notify the requesting party in writing that the request is denied 
and, if the proceeding is a formal adjudicative proceeding, that the 
party may request a hearing before the agency to challenge the denial; 
or 
(iii) notify the requesting party that further proceedings are re-
quired to determine the agency^s response to the request. 
(e) (i) Any notice required by Subsection (3)(d)(ii) shall contain the 
information required by Subsection 63-46b-5(l)(i) in addition to 
disclosure required by Subsection (3)(d)(ii) of this section. 
(ii) The agency shall mail any notice required by Subsection (3)(d) 
to all parties, except that any notice required by Subsection (3)(d)(iii) 
may be published when publication is required by statute. 
(iii) The notice required by Subsection (3)(d)(iii) shall: 
(A) give the agency's file number or other reference number; 
(B) give the name of the proceeding; 
(C) designate whether the proceeding is one of a category to be 
conducted informally according to the provisions of rules enacted 
nnHpr Rprtions 63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5, with citation to the appli-
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cable rule authorizing that designation, or formally according to 
the provisions of Sections 63-46b-6 to 63-46b-ll; 
(D) in the case of a formal adjudicative proceeding, and where 
respondent parties are known, state that a written response must 
be filed within 30 days of the date of the agency's notice if mailed, 
or within 30 days of the last publication date of the agency's 
notice, if published; 
(E) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, or if a hearing 
is to be held in an informal adjudicative proceeding, state the 
time and place of any scheduled hearing, the purpose for which 
the hearing is to be held, and that a party who fails to attend or 
participate in a scheduled and noticed hearing may be held in 
default; 
(F) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be informal, and a 
hearing is required by statute or rule, or if a hearing is permitted 
by rule and may be requested by a party within the time 
prescribed by rule, state the parties' right to request a hearing 
and the time within which a hearing may be requested under the 
agency's rules; and 
(G) give the name, title, mailing address, and telephone num-
ber of the presiding officer. 
(4) When initial agency determinations or actions are not governed by this 
chapter, but agency and judicial review of those initial determinations or 
actions are subject to the provisions of this chapter, the request for agency 
action seeking review must be filed with the agency within the time prescribed 
by the agency's rules. 
(5) For designated classes of adjudicative proceedings, an agency may, by 
rule, provide for a longer response time than allowed by this section, and may 
provide for a shorter response time if required or permitted by applicable 
federal law. 
(6) Unless the agency provides otherwise by rule or order, applications for 
licenses filed under authority of Title 32A, Chapters 3, 4, and 5, are not 
considered to be a request for agency action under this chapter. 
(7) If the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding is to award a license or 
other privilege as to which there are multiple competing applicants, the agency 
may, by rule or order, conduct a single adjudicative proceeding to determine the 
award of that license or privilege. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: C. 3 953, 63-46b-3, enacted by 
1987, ch. 361, § 259; 1988, ch. 72, § 36. 
ANALYSIS 
Applicable law. 





The reference to "law applicable" in Subsec-
tion (3)(a) is a reference to an agency's enabling 
statute as adopted by the legislature, not an 
agency's rules as adopted by the agency. 
Nielson v. Division of Peace Officer Stds. & 
Training, 851 P.2d 1201 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Defect in notice. 
— Waiver. 
Motorist's failure to object to the manner of 
notice or type of hearing at the beginning of a 
driver's license suspension hearing, when he 
o o o 
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<>3-46b-8. Pj~ocedures for formal adjudicative proceed-
ings — Hearing procedure. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3(d)(i) and (ii), in all formal 
.idjudicative proceedings, a hearing shall be conducted as follows: 
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the course of the hearing to 
obtain full disclosure of relevant facts and to afford all the parties 
reasonable opportunity to present their positions. 
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a party, the presiding officer: 
(i) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly 
repetitious; 
(ii) shall exclude evidence privileged in the courts of Utah; 
(iii) may receive documentary evidence in the form of a copy or 
excerpt if the copy or excerpt contains all pertinent portions of the 
original document; 
(iv) may take official notice of any facts that could be judicially 
noticed under the Utah Rules of Evidence, of the record of other 
proceedings before the agency, and of technical or scientific facts 
within the agency's specialized knowledge. 
(c) The presiding officer may not exclude evidence solely because it is 
hearsay. 
(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the opportunity to 
present evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit 
rebuttal evidence. 
(e) The presiding officer may give persons not a party to the adjudica-
tive proceeding the opportunity to present oral or written statements at 
the hearing. 
(f) All testimony presented at the hearing, if offered as evidence to be 
considered in reaching a decision on the merits, shall be given under oath. 
(g) The hearing shall be recorded at the agency's expense. 
(h) Any party, at his own expense, may have a person approved by the 
agency prepare a transcript of the hearing, subject to any restrictions that 
the agency is permitted by statute to impose to protect confidential 
information disclosed at the hearing. 
(i) All hearings shall be open to all parties. 
(2) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from taking appro-
priate measures necessary to preserve the integrity of the hearing. 
History: C. 3 953, 63-46b-8, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 161, § 264; 1988, ch. 72, § 19. 
Cross-References. — Judicial notice. Utah 
K. Evid. 201. 
Cross-examination. 
Agency decision revoking social worker's li-
cense was reversed and his case was remanded 
lor a new hearing, because the failure to afford 
him an opportunity to cross-examine the wit-
Privileges. Utah R. Evid. 501 et seq. 
nesses against him resulted in "substantial 
prejudice." D.B. v. Division of Occupational & 
Professional Licensing. 779 P.2d 1145 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 76-2-103 
76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or with intent or 
willfully"; "knowingly, or with knowledge"; 
"recklessly, or maliciously"; and "criminal negli-
gence or criminally negligent." 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of 
his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective 
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of 
his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with 
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that 
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surround-
ing his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when 
he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise 
in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: C. 3 953, 76-2-103, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-103; 1974, ch. 32, § 4. 
ANALYSIS 
Criminal negligence. 
— Expert testimony. 
Malice. 





The bending down of a stop sign at an inter-
action so that it was not visible to traffic was 
sufficient to constitute criminal negligence. 
State v. Hallett, 619 P.2d 335 (Utah 1980). 
The sole difference between reckless man-
flu ughter and negligent homicide is whether 
tin- defendant actually knew of the risk of death 
tn was not, but should have been, aware of it. In 
tx>th cases, a defendant's conduct must be a 
'l'ro6F deviation" from the standard of care 
rM-rcised by an ordinary person. Thus, ordi-
nary negligence, which is the basi6 for a civil 
action for damages, is not sufficient to consti-
tute criminal negligence. State v. Standiford, 
769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988). 
—Expert testimony. 
While expert testimony is not required to 
prove the mental state of a criminal defendant 
accused of homicide, expert testimony i6 re-
quired where criminal negligence is alleged and 
the nature and degree of risk are beyond the 
ken of the average layperson. State v. Warden, 
784 P.2d 1204 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), reVd on 
other grounds, 813 P.2d 1146 (Utah 1991). 
Trial court committed no abuse of discretion 
in allowing physicians to testify at defendant 
physician's trial for negligent homicide involv-
ing the death of an infant after a premature 
home delivery. State v. Warden, 784 P.2d 1204 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 




R657-26. Adjudicative Proceedings for a License, Permit, Tag, or Certificate 
of Registration. 
R657-26-1. Purpose and Authority. 
R657-26-2. Definitions. 
R657-26-3. Commencement of Revocation Proceedings. 
R657-26-4. Procedures for Revocation and Suspension Proceedings. 
R657-26-5. Hearings. 
R657-26-6. Issuance of Decision and Order. 
R657-26-7. Default. 
R657-26-8. Wildlife Board Review - Procedure. 
R657-26-9. Reinstatement of a License, Permit, Tag, or Certificate of Registration. 
R657-26-1. Purpose and Authority. 
Under authority of Subsection 23-19-9(12), this rule provides the procedures and standards 
for: 
(1) the revocation of a license, permit, tag, or certificate of registration; and 
(2) the suspension of a certificate of registration. 
R657-26-2. Definitions. 
(1) Terms used in this rule are defined in Section 23-13-2. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) "Flagrantly" means an act in violation of Title 23, Wildlife Resources Code committed in 
a manner that, in the opinion of the presiding officer, is conspicuously bad or offensive. 
(b) "Knowingly" means, with respect to the nature or the result of a person's conduct, that 
the person was aware, or should have been aware, that the conduct was reasonably certain to 
cause the result. 
(c) "Party" means the division, Wildlife Board, or respondent. 
(d) "Presiding officer" means the hearing officer appointed by the division director to 
conduct revocation or suspension proceedings. 
(e) "Respondent" means a person against whom a revocation proceeding is initiated. 
R657-26-3. Commencement of Revocation Proceedings. 
(l)(a) Each adjudicative proceeding shall be commenced by the presiding officer by filing a 
notice of agency action. 
(2) The notice of agency action shall be filed and served according to the requirements 
provided in Section 63-46b-3(2). 
(3) All revocation and suspension proceedings conducted by the presiding officer are 
designated as informal adjudications. The presiding officer may convert the hearing to a formal 
hearing anytime before a final order is issued if: 
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(a) conversion of the proceeding is in the public interest; and 
(b) conversion of the proceeding does not unfairly prejudice the rights of any party. 
R657-26-4. Procedures for Revocation and Suspension Proceedings. 
(l)(a) An answer or other pleading responsive to the allegations in the notice of agency 
action does not need to be filed by the respondent. 
(b) If an answer to the notice of agency action is filed, the answer shall include: 
(i) the name of the respondent; 
(ii) the case number or other reference number: 
(iii) the facts surrounding the allegations; 
(iv) a response to the allegations that the violation was committed knowingly and flagrantly; 
and 
(v) the date the answer was mailed. 
(2) The respondent may access any information contained in the division's files and all 
materials and information gathered in any investigation of the respondent, to the extent permitted 
by law. 
(3) Discovery and intervention is prohibited. 
R657-26-5. Hearings. 
(l)(a) The presiding officer shall provide the respondent with an opportunity for a hearing, 
(b) A hearing shall be held if the respondent requests a hearing within 20 days after the date 
the notice of agency action is issued. 
(2) The respondent, or a person designated by the respondent to appear on the respondent's 
behalf, may testify at the hearing and present any relevant information or evidence. 
(3) Hearings shall be open to all parties to the proceeding. 
(4) After reviewing all of the information provided by the parties, the presiding officer shall 
revoke the respondent's license, permit, tag, or certificate of registration if: 
(a) the presiding officer determines that the respondent flagrantly and knowingly: 
(i) violated or countenanced the violation of any: 
(A) provision of Title 23, Wildlife Resources Code; or 
(B) rule, proclamation, or order of the Wildlife Board; or 
(ii) while engaged in any activity regulated under Title 23, Wildlife Resources Code: 
(A) kills or injures domestic livestock; or 
(B) violates Section 76-10-508; or 
(b) upon receiving notification from another state's wildlife agency that a person has: 
(i) failed to comply with the terms of a wildlife citation; 
(ii) been convicted' of a violation that would warrant an action taken under Subsection (a); or 
(c) the person violated Section 23-20-14. 
(5) After reviewing all of the information provided by the parties, the presiding officer may 
revoke or suspend the certificate of registration of a person who fails to comply with the terms of 
a certificate of registration. 
(6)(a) The presiding officer may not revoke a person's license, permit, tag, or certificate of 
registration if: 
(i) the person was not charged with a violation in Subsection (4); 
(ii) the charges were dismissed; or 
(iii) the person was found not guilty of the violation in a court of law. 
(b) For purposes of this section, the following shall not be construed as a finding of not 
guilty: 
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(i) a plea of guilty; 
(ii) a plea of no contest; or 
(Hi) the entry of a plea in alu 2. 
(7) -The presiding, officer SLM v insider any recommendatioi 1 made by a sentencii ig cot 11: t 
concerning revocation before issuing a revocation order. 
R657-26-6. ISSIIJIIIIT of Decision 11 nil Order, 
(1) Within a reasonable time after the close c; .,u ..djudieaiive proceeding, the presiding 
officer shall issue a signed, written order that stated 
(a) the decision; 
(b) the reasons for the decision; 
(c) a notice of any right of adminii,aa!;vL o; j J i , uu , , , u ,> .. 1 
(d) the time limits for filing an appeal or requesting a review. 
H^ Thi decision and order shall be based on facts appearing in divisic: .m in (In, 
iLi u>nv and facts presented in evidence at the hearing. 
(3) A copy of the decision and order shall be promptly mailed to all parties. 
R657-26-7. Default. 
(1) The presiding officer may enter an order of default against the respondent if 1:1le 
respondent fails to participate, either in writing or in person, in the adjudicative proceeding. 
(2) Upon issuing the order of default, the presiding officer shall complete the adjudicative 
proceeding without participation of the party in default and shall: 
(a) include a statement of the grounds for default; 
(b) make a finding of all relevant issues required in Sections R657-26-5(4) or (5); and 
(c) mail a copy of the order to all parties. 
(3)(a) A defaulted party may seek to have the preMumr oiinei set aside the default order, and 
any order in the adjudicative proceeding issued suhsequctit to such default, by following the 
procedures outlined in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(b) A motion to set and- -» ^•r-r ,< - V- l ;„ ^sequent jfdt: .ade to the 
presiding officer. 
(c) A defaulted part\ may seek Wildlife hoard Review under Section R657-26-S oni^  j 
decision of the pr^'idim- <JXw •• * 'be m< -\ o? io set aside the default. 
R657-26-8. Wildlife Board Review - Procedure. 
(l)(a) A person may file an appeal of a presiding office; N decision with the Wildlife board 
(b) The appeal must be in writing and the respondent --IMII --end a copy of the appeal by mail 
to the chair of the Wildlife Board and each of the parties. 
(2) The appeal must be filed within 30 days after the issuance oi the presidii ig Dfficei fs 
decision and order. 
(3) The appeal shall: 
(a) be signed by the respondent or the respondent's legal .*>•-• 
(b) state the grounds for appeal and the relief requested; an* 
(c) state the date upon which it was mailed. 
(4)(a) Within 15 days after the mailing dn 
response with the Wildlife Board 
(b) A copy of the response shall tx ^m U mail 10 the chair of the \\ udlife Board a 
of the parties. 
(5) The Wildlife Board shall ; i formal heanpi: ;K cordrmc* *i !tb the pnn; 
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Section 63-46b-6 through Section 63-46b-10. The Wildlife Board may convert the hearing to an 
informal hearing anytime before a final order is issued if: 
(a) conversion of the proceeding is in the public interest; and 
(b) conversion of the proceeding does not unfairly prejudice the rights of any party. 
(6) At the conclusion of the hearing, the Wildlife Board may: 
(a) take no action; 
(b) vacate or remand the decision; or 
(c) amend the duration of revocation or suspension ordered by the presiding officer. 
(7)(a) If the Wildlife Board takes any action to vacate or remand the decision or amend the 
duration of revocation or suspension, the chair of the Wildlife Board shall, within a reasonable 
time, issue a written order on review. 
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the chair of the Wildlife Board and mailed to each 
party. 
(c) The order on review shall contain: 
(i) a designation of the statute permitting review; 
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed; 
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues reviewed; 
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues reviewed; 
(v) whether the decision of the presiding officer is to be affirmed, reversed, modified, and 
whether all or any portion of the adjudicative proceeding is to be remanded; 
(vi) a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration or judicial review; and 
(vii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review. 
(8) Any review of a presiding officer's decision shall be strictly limited to the matter 
specified in the order. 
R657-26-9. Reinstatement of a License, Permit, Tag, or Certificate of Registration. 
(1) A presiding officer may reinstate a person's license, permit, tag, or certificate of 
registration revoked under Subsection 23-19-9(1 )(b)(i) upon receiving a written request for 
reinstatement. 
(2) The person making the request shall include: 
(a) the person's name, phone number, and mailing address; 
(b) the number of the license, permit, tag, or certificate of registration that was revoked; 
(c) the date the violation occurred; 
(d) the date the request was mailed; 
(e) the state in which the violation occurred; 
(!) a copy of a receipt from the court where the violation was processed stating the violation 
is no longer outstanding; and 
(g) the person's signature. 
(3) Within a reasonable time of receiving the request, the presiding officer shall issue a 
written order stating whether the request is granted or denied and the reasons for the decision. 
(4) If a presiding officer denies a person's request for reinstatement, the person may submit a 
request for reconsideration by following the procedures provided in Section 63-46b-13. 
References: 23-13-2, 23-14-1, 23-14-19, 23-19-9, 23-20-14, 63-46b-13, 67-46b-5. 
History: 11718, NEW. 06/01/91: 12752. AMD. 06/15/92; 16884, AMD, 06/14/95; 17439, 
AMD, 01/16/96; 17936, AMD, 09/09/96; 18313, 5YR, 11/15/96; 18581, AMD, 03/18/97. 
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ADDENDUM C 
S I ATE OF UTAH 
•EPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
DIVISION OF WILDLIFE RESOURCES 
In the Matter of the Peimit of: ) NOTJCE OF AGENCY ACTION 
Joseph Bradbury, Respondent ) 
to Harvest Protected Wildlife in the ) Case No. 98-0752 
State of Utah . ) ' 
1. This Notice of Agency Action is to inform Respondent that the Utah Division Of 
Resources is commencing an adjudicative proceeding to consider the revocation, and 'or 
suspension of Respondent's privileges to harvest protected will llife ii i the State of I Jli il I Il: I tin >n 
is initialed as an informal adjudicative proceeding under the jurisdictional and procedural aiitlioi it) 
c 
2. The Division alleys that on December 15, 1999, Respondent plead gi lilt] ' and was 
convicted in tl le Uii itali Cc mnty Justice Coui t c >f violating Utah Code A nn § 23-20 -4, a Class A 
Misdemeanor, Criminal Case Nuinbei , ! ( ] ' ' ' i r ' M 
Respondent shot and killed a bull « Ik Non-resident Limited Entry Book Cliffs Elk K » 
\\ 5 i.; II.LI alleged that Respondent knowingly aiid flag]aiitl> committed the acts that resulted in the 
aforementioned u .- *, i. 
"L_—Z!?e- "*'''" * r] ^"~ i 1 ' , A L v l l l l £ ? iS l u l k u r n " ; ' l i : -vliLiiiu ii.L la^.o u,»uunm t the 
criminal conviction were conimitted knowingly and flap ,;nil\. Ir tlis; I hvision determines that the 
illegal acts were co;i n n litted knowingly and flagranti} h.- ;i> u \ oke any wi kiine licenses or permits 
tllat Respondent currently holds < \ 
4. Respondent is entitled to request a hearing before the Division to contest the 
allegations in the Notice of Agency Action. The request for hearing must be made in writing and 
received by the Division no later than 20 days from the date this notice is issued. If Respondent fails 
to request a hearing or otherwise fails to respond to the Notice of Agency Action within 20 days, an 
order of default judgement will be entered revoking Respondent's privileges to harvest protected 
wildlife in the State of Utah. 
5. Upon receiving a request for hearing or a response to the Notice of Agency Action, 
the Division will schedule a date and time for a hearing where Respondent will have the opportunity 
to testify, call witnesses, and present evidence in his behalf. Respondent's personal attendance at the 
hearing will be required where Respondent can either represent himself or employ the services of 
a legal advisor. Following the hearing, the Division will issue a written decision and order detailing 
the legal and factual rationale for the decision. 
6. The Division will provide Respondent, upon request, any information and documents 
in its files relevant to this proceeding and to the extent permitted by law. 
7. Pursuant to the Wildlife Violator Compact, Title 23, Chapter 5 of the Utah Code, any 
order revoking or suspending Respondent's privileges to harvest protected wildlife in Utah may be 
given reciprocal recognition in the following states: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Maryland, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming. 
8. AH written pleadings and communications concerning this Notice of Agency Action 
shall be identified by the case name and number reflected in the caption of this notice, and directed 
to Debbie Sundell, Utah Division of Wildlife Resources, 1594 West North Temple, 
S. i l l II j i k i t ill', I l l i ih M II I n II1" II in ! in ii i i l l |i ri**U J " ' IT III l ' i ' | i i i i i i i l t i i l lllri^ a:i ir; in: lfoi i i lati : n :: i a 
statement that should be reviewed pi io? \c the hearing, he should submit that inibnnatioii to the 
Division at the above address so that it i :i lay be considered and i nade a part of the record 
B ' M ' F H Kiiir 'Oihil.ii, ni liiiiii "iiiiNini 
Di\ :iioi. ol Wildlife Resources 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the 29thday of June, 2000,1 caused to be delivered by certified mail, return 
receipt requested, a true and correct copy of the attached Notice of Agency Action addressed to the 
following person(s): 
Joseph Bradbury 
4606 North 50 West 
Provo UT 84601 
Valerie Westphal * 
Executive Secretary 
Division of Wildlife Resources 
STATE OF l I'M 11 
DEPARTMENT OF NATIIRA I, Kl SOURCES 
WILDLIFE I" »A»P 
) 
Joseph J. Bradbury, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, DIVISION 












* I 1 I ' I V i % I t J ! \ 1 i 1 
KGROI sc» 
ml iiijjjunj ii.ih-i ht iiiiiL in the above-captioned 
inatler on Mav 
Salt Lake City, Utan. Hoard members Collin Allan. Ra\ mond Heaton. Paul Nu-meyer Osrn-
llMMiiiji IIK ndla I iu lii-ui ( urn lliunl^ s .null 11,111 man \\ la,- IMOIJJ.HI M l ) were presei it 4 11 
participated in and unanimously agreed to the decision. The Board conducted the formal Iiear 
under provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, I Jtah Division of Wildlife 
Nrsnini i s ("I )\Vh' ' I Minim in iili  i I-'mli1 i I i iillii i ,i|i|i|ii illilii Ihiv. 
Assistant Attorney Genual Martin bu^luian represented DWR at the Hearing. Appellant 
Joseph 13i adbury was represented by his attorney,, Robert C. Fillerup. 
hWIMMf in I (.1(1 ' Inp lh i i i i l r ' l iT in l m 1 K/! mil if film I M , \\\n lll.iiii lns i | Il I, Jllii JUL my 
testified on his own behalf \ 
1 
After hearing from all parlies, receiving full disclosure of relevant facts, reviewing submitted 
exhibits, and considering the evidence and relevant law, the Board hereby makes the following 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, offers reasons for its decisions, and issues the order below. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
I. Joseph Bradbury is a resident of Utah and he is domiciled in Utah. Mr. Bradbury 
admitted before the Board and Judge Anderson that he is a resident of Utah. He currently resides 
at 4606 North 50 West, Provo, Utah, and he has lived in Utah for at least fourteen years. Mr. 
Bradbury claims Utah residency for business, tax and voting purposes. 
2. Mr. Bradbury has never been a legal resident of Idaho. 
3. In November of 1993, Joseph Bradbury traveled to Meridian, Idaho, and obtained an 
Idaho driver's license. 
4. Mr. Bradbury obtained the Idaho driver's license using the following address: 1524 
Meridian Street, Meridian, Idaho. This address is that of the Almost Home Day Care Center, owned 
by Mr. Bradbury's sister. Joseph Bradbury has never lived at this address. 
5. From 1993 to 1998, Joseph Bradbury obtained Idaho resident hunting licenses using the 
Idaho address of the Almost Home Day Care Center. 
6. In 1996, Joseph Bradbury applied for a nonresident hunting license in Utah. On the 
application, Mr. Bradbury listed 1524 Meridian Street, Meridian, Idaho, as his address and signed 
a statement attesting that all information contained in the application was "true and correct." 
7. In 1997, Joseph Bradbury applied for and obtained a Utah nonresident limited entry Book 
Cliffs Elk Permit. He again listed the Meridian, Idaho address of his sister's day care center as his 
address and signed the application, indicating that all statements therein were "true and correct." Mr. 
2 
Bradbury coi ui ••*!•* be uiiLJiL*; o. *,.; .-. .M . 
»' in nhr I.ill nl fWN rin .inuiivinous caller contacted DWR Officer Jack Tophani * 
the agency's hotline and i eporied that Mr. Bradbury 1 lad ui ilawfully obtained a Utah nonresident 
1 luntii ig license foi the past five years 
jjadbury shot a six-poii it bull elk ostensibl) ui idei 
autl lority of the nonresident limited entry Book Cliffs Bull Elk Permit. 
11
 On Septembci w , .< >* ^^dbury was i. i 
hnii- : iiiiii,in, IiJiiIi" , ne count of purchasing *;K, l vviong class license" foi huntm^ , •< 
v nuni ui purchasing. n»« ' vTong class tag" for elk, and one count of purchasing the "wrong class tag" 
,ree ronv, A , bident 
hunting licenses. As a iwo«..,,-«. iiiadbui) i Idaho hunting pmiktu^ u c t icvoktd lor a period 
of I wo years. 
bury pled (.Minify at a hearing in the Eighth District 
Court. I mstah County, Utah, io a * u»lation of Utah Code Annotated § 23-20-4, "wanton destn iction 
of wildlife, " a I. law A MjMk.ncanu. I lit u i . 1 . I i1 lu < ,1 I L I'ni Hi 'i, liil hi m \ \\ini\\ 
II I I I l l< \ ill i i unlawfully obtained Utah nonresident lii i lited entry Book Cliffs Bull Elk Pern lit in 
1997 Defendant was represented at the hearing by his coi insci - *orr^t! 
CI il\l I Ii1* U iI'M I I i I ' I n\ * 1SION 
13. Utah Code Annotated § 23-19-9 requires that a w i 1111 i Ie 1 icense, permit, or tag be revoked 
if a person "flagrantly and k now ing'y, violates...,th[e] title." 
I >Mh .'iliiinii «u"' • l«,lll«\/'Jll!hJliI!)| i) il< Inn •• Il.it'i.mllv In mr.m in u ( in 
1 illf ?":i committed in a manner that...is coi ispicuousiy bad oi offensive." 
3 
15. Utah Administrative Code R657-26-2(2)(b) defines "knowingly" to mean "with respect 
to the nature or the result of a person's conduct, that the person was aware, or should have been 
aware, that the conduct was reasonably certain to cause the result." 
16. Utah Code Annotated § 23-19-5 makes it unlawful for any person to "obtain a license, 
permit, tag . . . by fraud, deceit or misrepresentation (i)t is unlawful for a resident to purchase 
a nonresident license." 
17. Utah Code Annotated § 23-13-2(36) defines "resident" as "a person who: (i) has been 
domiciled in the state of Utah for six consecutive months immediately preceding the purchase of a 
license; and (ii) does not claim residency for hunting, fishing or trapping in any other state or 
country." 
18. Utah Code Annotated § 23-20-4 provides that a person is guilty of "wanton destruction 
of protected wildlife" if he "posess[es] protected wildlife . . . unaccompanied by a valid . . . tag." 
19. Utah Code Annotated § 23-13-2(34)(a) defines "protected wi ldlife" to include "vertebrate 
animals living in nature, except feral animals." 
20. Based upon the testimony and exhibits presented by both parties at the hearing, and 
taking into account the DWR Hearing Officer's previous order relating to this case, the Board finds 
that Mr. Bradbury was a Utah resident for the purpose of hunting. Utah Code Annotated § 23-13-
2(36) defines "resident" as "a person who: (i) has been domiciled in the state of Utah for six 
consecutive months immediately preceding the purchase of a license; and (ii) does not claim 
residency for hunting, fishing or trapping in any other state or country." Mr. Bradbury admits that 
he meets the definition's first criteria because he was domiciled in Utah for six consecutive months 
immediately before purchasing his license. However, he argues that he did not meet the second 
4 
criteria because he claimed residency in Idaho for hi inting, fishing, or trapping purposes, i u: in : i , 
thert lou m ^ <•• -
Iii Mi \ cinhri iif 1 *KH Joseph Bradbury traveled to Meridian, Idaho and obtained an Idaho 
driver's license ihsmg ihc address of his sister's business located in Meridian, Idahi Although he 
has never Ih id . ^ .. . . - bradbury t . L, ensesandtags 
in hunting licenses and tags in Utah. Mr. Bradbui} nas re^. i rd in I tah n.n 
at least Juur**-f tars a n 1 t Ltiuv UiJ i »esideno f" business, tax and i oting purposes, 
N . I i | licenses has led to 
nur. JniiH'.'iiiitii'i crii ninal convictioi is ii i both Idaho and in Utah. On September 2 3, 1000 Mi 
Bradbury was convicted in the Seventh District Court., Bonne ,,,* - . I..*.. . .. i 
purchasL.. s ' puienaMiig the "wrong clasi lag'1 loi 
e j j ^ a n cj o n e C 0 U nt of purchasing the "wrong class tag" foi bear, Mr. Biadhury ' s Idaho hunting 
privileges were revoked lor upci iw,.-.-, , wo years. < hi 1  !"cn IIIIM'I I "» I  "J '•> I Ill III J linn " p Ilk "ill )>mll; " 
at a I iea i ii ig III thr 1 *" i^hth District Court, Uintah County, Utah, to "wanton destruction of wildlife". 
These facts lead the Board to coi iclude that Mr Bradbury may have cluiihe-J Idaho 
residency ioi huniing, hsluiij/«'i iuppm[ ' I1"!!! lluil IIIM I.IIIII •, .'.i;1- imr .n JHCM nlation 11 'it," if ft ore, Mr. 
Bradbury in eiie^t - — ^ u*«. duuugh lisrepresentation he should maintain hi:- hunting 
privileges. The Boaru concludes that Mr. Bradbui v - act ., ,. r rumvei | 3 
prevent a pei *' • Mc^cntaiiuu. ii is 
unlawful for any person to obtain or attempt to obtain a license, permit , tag , , by fraud, deceit, 
_i r ^represent;.- *" ' Viwfu! for a resident to pirchnsc n nonresident license "" 1 hiili "I ode 
Annotated v, . ... . . \ntt\n si ." iiii! 11I M i n i n g 
a license for hunting, fishing, and trapping. 
21. The Board concludes that Mr. Bradbury knowingly and flagrantly violated Utah Code 
Ann. §23-19-5: 
(a) the Board concludes the violation occurred "knowingly" because the evidence 
presented to the Board demonstrates that Mr. Bradbury knew he was a resident of Utah in 
1996 and 1997, but he applied for and obtained a nonresident hunting license and permit. 
Joseph Bradbury is domiciled in Utah. He currently resides at 4606 North 50 West, Provo, 
Utah, and he has lived in Utah for at least fourteen years. Mr. Bradbury claims Utah 
residency for business, tax and voting purposes and he has never lived in Idaho. 
(b) the Board determines the violation occurred "flagrantly," or in a conspicuously bad 
or offensive manner, because: 
(1) Mr. Bradbury misrepresented his residence by listing the Idaho address 
of the Almost Home Day Care Center as his address on his 1997 application 
for a nonresident limited entry Book Cliffs Elk Permit. Mr. Bradbury has 
never lived in Idaho. Mr. Bradbury signed a statement on the application 
indicating that this information was "true and correct," when he knew in fact 
that it was a misrepresentation. 
(2) Mr. Bradbury was prosecuted and convicted in an Idaho court for 
purchasing an Idaho resident hunting license and tags, indicating that he 
obtained the license and tags in an unlawful manner and that he was not a 
resident of Idaho; 
(3) Mr. Bradbury was prosecuted and convicted in Utah of wanton 
6 
destn iciion of protected wildlife loi haiveMing a M pm i i 
\* 11 In ill 11 ii I in I t. '. '.' .. 
20 'be remedv prescribed be low by the Board is appropriate because : 
(4, . 'V* U . lacUilly m a n a g e s the taking of voph> jn in iu ls , sin li a.1, MA ( I .I ,I I M M 
.. .n.»i.,e oi sucl i i.K t > K mi -ilrnirh siniill population; 
«M bull elk cannot be replaced in one or two years; 
( J] limiting is a privilege granted by the State to those u/lliwr I I • • < « < 
rules anr 111.i« in i '. : * * s e l e c t wildlife and «;.v«v 
i< to implement its management objectives; 
(d) hunting violations harm wildlife resources, 
KMHih'i , i ii I linn: i \(n"( i.itioh'i " I other hunters; 
^w/ , -venting wiMlilt: law violators from hunting for a pet iod of ill ne redresses 
u
— iey have caused by piru'inin^"1 M i i mi i iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii" | ,i"* l ,M ' "iolations and 
oDOrtunities to other hunters .\ h« «ivt- IU»I violated I ties; and 
ne penod of suspension imposed U v u * . ..; , cons is ten t \ I i I< 
11111 
ORDER 
H.if.td upon the foi ego ing , and in a c c o r d a n c e ni l l i I ii.ih < mil, • • 11M•< Mi il (, J * HI ' \ i 
i ioaid actions 
The Hea r ing Off icer ' s J a n u a i y 25 200 \ Oei ;>>ion and O r d e r suspending J o s e p h J. 
Bradbury ' s hunting p r iv i l eges for a per iod of five yea r s is ^, i u M C .~ , ; 
hunting puvileges are suspi IMM M M < l • . N o v e m b e i 2 9 , ^uuO, and 
ending November 28, 2005. 
(2) During this suspension period, Mr. Bradbury may not obtain or possess any hunting 
license issued by the State of Utah. Any Utah hunting license obtained during this period is invalid. 
(3) Mr. Bradbury is hereby notified that this Order is given reciprocal recognition by all 
states participating in the Wildlife Violator Compact, including Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Maryland, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming. 
(4) Mr. Bradbury is also notified that if he commits a wildlife-related violation during 
the suspension period, such violation will, by definition, be considered knowing and flagrant and 
could lead to a suspension of hunting privileges for an additional five years. 
DATED this c^k day of September, 2001. 




In accordance with Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-l 3, Appellant may seek reconsideration 
of this Order within 20 days from the issue date. The request must be made in writing to Dr. Max 










 '''' '" '^'l" "•'•"• ' M ' »" ^ u : e d gn,u.,ds for reconsideration, and 
contain the date of mailing. 
Appellant may seek judicial review of this order in district court by filing a petition for 
judicial review within 30 days of the date of this Order, i„ accordance with Utah Code Annotated 
§§ 63-46b-14, 63-46b-15, and other applicable h law. 
9 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ^ 
  A I L I I N U ^  
I, ^ ~ ~ £- "frp'frfr certify that on the 
day of September, 2001, I placed in the United 
States Mail, postage prepaid, copies of the attached Order addressed to: 
Joseph J. Bradbury 
4606 N. 50 W. 
Provo,UT 84601 
Robert C. Fillerup 
Attorney at Law 
1107S. OremBlvd 
Orem, UT 84058 
Martin Bushman 
Assistant Attorney General 
1594 West North Temple, # 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
10 
